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I. Introduction
For egalitarians fairness requires that, as much as possible, like cases be treated alike. This 
paper is motivated by a commitment to egalitarian fairness, and by a few simple intuitions about 
the role of luck in determining outcomes in accident law: both in terms of liability for 
carelessness and compensation for misfortune. 
Egalitarians hold that all persons are alike in at least one relevant sense, we stand as moral 
equals to one another with an equal interest in being responsible for our lives. Fairness requires 
our equality and responsibility be respected in social interactions and institutions. The concept of 
luck has been used by many egalitarians as a way of giving content to fairness by differentiating 
between those benefits and burdens which result from informed choice from those that result 
from fate or fortune. Many egalitarians explore negating luck as a way of expressing their 
commitments to treating people as moral equals whose lives should, as much as possible, be a 
reflection of choice as opposed to the afflictions of chance. This is the normative premise of our 
paper, we call it the “fairness test”. As we explain more below, the fairness test assess whether 
luck is allowed to play an unjustified role in compensation for similar losses or liability for 
similar wrongs. 
Many egalitarian political theorists have also recognized, if not defended, the notion of 
distinct forms of justice, namely corrective, retributive, and distributive. Corrective justice 
concerns the fair terms of rectification for largely unintentional private wrongs, such as bilateral 
accidents, and the losses that flow from such private wrongs. Retributive justice concerns the fair 
terms of punishment for public wrongs, intentional acts of harm to others which offend the social 
order, according to principles of harm and moral blameworthiness. Distributive justice concerns 
the fair terms of allocation of social burdens and benefits in terms of the design of core social 
and economic institutions. Although theorists of these different forms of justice have been 
concerned with negating unfair luck inside the operations of each form of justice, there has been 
little attention to the way in which luck operates to sort cases into each form of justice. We claim 
that there is a significant way in which luck operates to subject different people to principles of 
corrective, retributive, and distributive justice which flies in the face of the egalitarian value of 
fairness: a commitment to treating people as moral equals with like interests in being responsible 
for their own lives. Our claim is that there is a way that egalitarian fairness transcends the 
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analytical boundaries of different forms of justice. Thus we think that the maintaining strict
analytical boundaries between RJ, DJ and CJ fails the “fairness test” and is therefore unjustified.  
In order to motivate this intuition, consider the following cases. The first three describe 
victims of misfortune, the next four describe doers of careless or non-careless actions. 
Amy is 20 years old. She became blind as a result of a car accident. It was the other driver’s 
fault. If Amy lives in a no-fault state, a state which administers automobile accident losses via 
regulated insurance markets, then she is expected to receive a fixed sum of money calculated to 
compensate her for her injuries and associated medical bills from her insurance company. If she 
does not live in a no-fault state then she is expected to collect, under most circumstances, a larger 
fixed sum of money which will compensate her for her injuries and associated medical bills 
(possibly, in addition, pain and suffering and/or punitive damages) from the other driver or her
insurance company.
Bill is 20 years old. He became blind as a result of a car accident. The other driver was at 
fault yet under-insured. Specifically, the other driver’s insurance limit was at the state mandated 
minimum. The other driver has no other assets to collect from, and therefore Bill can recover no 
more than the policy limit, which will be much less than the fixed sum received by Amy.
Carol is 20 years old. She became blind as a result of a congenital disease, like 
meningitis. At best, if she is well insured, she will have her basic medical costs covered. At 
worst she will not be able to get private insurance and will turn to federal programs such as SSI 
and Medicaid, and be able to get some minimal medical coverage and perhaps a relatively low 
monthly disability benefit.
Consider the following drivers. David is an attentive, careful driver. Every day he leaves for 
work on time and obeys the speed limit and other norms of safe driving. One morning he is 
rushed, speeds to work, and on the way causes an accident because of his speeding. David hits 
Amy and is found liable for her ensuing blindness. 
Emmanuel speeds to work recklessly everyday. He sleeps in and leaves late. In his haste he 
cuts off other cars, runs Stop signs, speeds, and otherwise flouts the norms of safe driving on a 
daily basis. Emmanuel  never gets into an accident, partially because other drivers accommodate 
his reckless driving by slowing down and exercising extra caution in his presence. On the 
morning David hits Amy, Ernie would have hit another driver had it not been for the fortuitous 
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intervention of a bird which caused the other driver to swerve, thereby preventing him from 
hitting the other driver’s car. Emmanuel  never bears any cost for his reckless driving. 
Francie is a careful driver who never exceeds the speed limit or violates norms of careful 
driving. Every day she takes the same route to work as Emmanuel , and exercises extra caution 
because of Emmanuel ’s unpredictable driving.
Case A, B, and C have one major thing in common: they all suffered the loss of their eyesight 
at no fault of their own. In so far as the loss was not the fault of the individual who suffered it, 
these losses are, in a relevant normative sense, alike. Yet each person ends up with very different 
access to compensation for his or her loss. As mentioned above, Amy will end up with full 
compensation for medical costs, lost income, cost of accommodating her life to blindness, and if 
she lives in a “negligence” state, as opposed to a “no-fault” state, she may even be awarded pain 
and suffering and punitive damages. Bill will end up with possibly only a fraction of his medical 
bills paid from the underinsured motorist who hit him; he will be left to bear the remainder of the 
costs of his injury himself. Carol, if she is uninsured at the time her disease is discovered, will be 
uninsurable in the private market for insurance as it relates to the disease that caused her 
blindness. Both Bill and Carol might be able to get some monthly benefits through a combination 
of public programs (i.e. Medicare, SSDI, SSI, and if their income drops Medicaid).  
The decisive factor determining what compensation will be available to A, B, or C is 
something outside of his or her control. It is whether or not each can attribute the ‘cause’ of his 
or her blindness to the negligence of another person, and the level of insurance the other driver 
carried at the time of the accident. (We ignore for now the level of insurance that they carried). 
We commonly talk about those factors which are outside our control as luck. Therefore, the
compensation available to these equally innocent victims is largely due to luck. 
Cases D and E have one major thing in common: they both violated the duty of care 
established by the norms of safe driving. The decisive factor that renders D liable for massive 
damages, and not E, is something outside of both of their control—the position of other drivers, 
and one little bird—factors we understand as luck. In fact, F, the consistently careful driver, is 
treated the same as the E, the consistently careless driver. Therefore, the liability imposed on 
these equally faulty drivers (D & E) is largely due to luck, as is the equal treatment of unequally 
careless drivers (E & F).
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Are cases A, B, and C—and D and E—alike in a normatively relevant sense such that their 
differential treatment is unjustified? Many of us would share the moral intuitions that there is 
something counterintuitive about the dissimilar outcomes illustrated by these cases given their 
relevant similarities. We think it fails the fairness test: luck and nothing more determines 
dissimilar outcomes of otherwise similar cases. Yet, those familiar with the distinction between 
corrective justice and its institutional form of tort law, and other forms and institutions of justice,
are also all familiar with reasons explaining these differential outcomes as both normal and 
acceptable. These reasons have to do with the distinction between corrective and distributive
justice with respect to cases A,B and C, and the distinction between retributive and corrective
justice with respect to cases D and E. 
Most theorists of tort law would maintain that the differential outcomes illustrated by cases A 
through F are not necessarily unfair. Such theorists would explain the differential outcomes with 
reference to the distinction between corrective justice and other forms of justice, namely 
distributive and retributive. Cases A, B and D are subject to the principles of corrective justice, 
whereas cases C and E are subject to the principles of distributive and retributive justice, 
respectively. Retributive justice (RJ) is concerned with the adequate response to those who, 
through intentional harms to others, create an imbalance in the social order which must be 
addressed by actions against that violator in proportion to moral blameworthiness; it is a theory 
typically associated with criminal law. Corrective justice (CJ) is concerned with rectification of 
losses attributable to ‘private’ wrongs and the associated (typically) unintended harmful 
consequences; it is a theory associated with tort law. Distributive justice (DJ) is concerned with 
the allocation of social benefits and duties among members of a political community; it is a 
theory which is associated with tax and transfer laws. Traditionally, RJ, CJ and DJ have been 
considered distinct forms of justice operating on different spheres of human affairs,1 just as their 
respective areas of law operate largely independently of one another.
Accordingly, cases A, B and D are subject to corrective justice because they involve losses 
suffered from and caused by human agency. Cases C and E fall to distributive and retributive 
justice (respectively) because they cannot be so connected to human agency. Case C (meningitis) 
1
 To use Aristotle’s famous metaphore, corrective enforces an arithmetic equality in transactions such that no 
individual may gain or lose their due according to the norms of interaction; distributive justice enforces a geometric 
proportion such that each citizen contributes and receives a portion of social resources according some merit, 
however social resources and merit are defined. 
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represents loss caused by, perhaps a cruel God or the vicissitudes of nature, but by no agent in 
particular; case E (the reckless driver who hits no one) represents a wrong involving losses to no 
one in particular. The distinction between CJ, DJ and RJ creates a sorting rule by which cases of 
misfortune and misconduct are placed under the auspices of one or another form of justice. These 
cases are subject to distinct forms of justice, and that is what produces differential patterns of 
cost bearing. 
The conviction motivating this paper is that the theoretical claims which support these 
distinctions between forms and institutions of justice violate a basic notion of fairness which 
transcends the bounds of either CJ, DJ or RJ. Surprisingly, many tort theorists not only dismiss 
the idea that the distinction between forms of justice creates an unfair pattern of responsibility 
(and the cost bearing it entails), but rather defend the distinction between CJ and DJ and RJ as 
embodying a basic commitment to fairness. We think not. 
Corrective, retributive and distributive justice share a comparable commitment to egalitarian 
fairness by negating luck as a significant determinant of the rewards and burdens in peoples’ 
lives inside their respective spheres of justice. However, we argue that maintaining a 
commitment to categorical distinctions between these forms of justice paradoxically violates 
egalitarian fairness. In other words, the strict separation between CJ, RJ and DJ fails the fairness 
test because luck sorts cases between spheres of justice, creating dissimilar outcomes for similar 
cases.
Section II briefly fleshes out the concept of luck as essentially a normative designation in 
a substantive theory of fairness which respects both equality and responsibility. Sections III and 
IV identify the role of luck in both DJ and RJ. We will highlight how both DJ and RJ struggle 
with the same question: what types of luck must be negated to realize the moral equality of 
persons in a society? Our main point in those Sections is that, with some qualifications, in both 
theories (RJ and DJ) the conceptions of fairness are determined through the paradigm that brute 
luck (to borrow Dworkin’s term indicating luck not attributable to choice) should be negated,
while option luck (that which is the upshot of informed choice) should not be.2 In Section V we 
will argue that these conceptions of fairness from distributive and retributive justice cannot be 
completely excluded from evaluation of fairness in corrective justice. While luck does play a 
major role in the realm of CJ especially in the various doctrines related to causation, its role is 
2
 The terms “brute luck” and “option luck” will be developed and further defined, see supra Section III.
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totally internal to the operations of CJ. There is no similar attempt to negate the arbitrariness of 
luck with respect to whether cases should be subject to CJ institutions (e.g. tort law) in the first 
place.  In Sections VI and VII we argue that two ways in which the isolation of CJ principles 
from both DJ and RJ lead to an unfair operation of luck in the determination of liability for 
equally careless actors, and compensation for equally blameless victims. 
In Section VII. A. we argue that neither theoretical nor practical arguments for the acoustic 
separation of these principles justify the costs to fairness this distinction creates.3 We explore the 
justifications that (mainly CJ) theorists have presented for maintaining the distinction between 
CJ and DJ. These include: that DJ is about fair allocation of societal resources whereas CJ is 
about rectifying private wrongs; that DJ requires thick whereas CJ requires thin concept of 
personality; that DJ operates on a global view of the interactions, whereas CJ’s view is local; and 
that DJ generates general duties or reasons for action, whereas CJ imposes specific duties on 
particular individuals to undertake particular actions. 
We argue that these distinctions, while interesting, lack normative significance. Maintaining 
those distinctions preserves CJ as a distinct justice-machine, yet at the expense of global fairness. 
Indeed, maintaining these distinctions shows theorists’ commitment to CJ and not to fairness, or 
at least so we argue. 
II. Luck and Fairness
Our motivation in this project is simple: fairness requires that, as much as possible, like 
cases be treated alike, and cases that differ upon normatively relevant vectors be treated 
differently. The contours of CJ, DJ and RJ (and the contours of their political or institutional 
manifestations: tort law, tax and social security law, and criminal law respectively) are human 
constructs that must derive their legitimacy from external, pragmatic or moral, foundations. 
Either notions of cost and efficiency, or normative notions such as fairness, equality and 
responsibility, must inform the contours of these theories of justice, and their institutional 
manifestations. At this point, we ignore costs and efficiency considerations and focus on fairness. 
As we show at length below, major theorists have a dual commitment as their starting point. One 
is an egalitarian commitment to fairness in the sense of negating the role of (some) luck in 
3
 We use the term “acoustic” separation to denote the construction of analytical or conceptual barriers between 
forms of justice which prevent principles from one form of justice, say RJ or DJ, from seeping into considerations of 
fairness in another form of justice, say CJ.
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determining one’s burdens and rewards. We share this commitment. What we do not share is a 
separate, unnecessary in our view, commitment to maintaining an acoustic separation between 
CJ and DJ or RJ, when by doing so it fails the fairness test.4  It seems odd to us to have a 
theoretical pre-commitment to a distinction between forms of justice. We, on the other, have just 
one commitment, to fairness. 
The costs to fairness arise, in our view, from the role that luck and control play in our 
lives. Cases A through E demonstrate how otherwise equal actors face different outcomes 
because of something outside of their control, something which is mere luck. We argue that if
one accepts the notion that luck should not determine people’s desert and responsibility, then the 
distinction between CJ and DJ and RJ must be revisited.
In the following three sections we will discuss the role of control and luck in corrective, 
distributive and retributive justice and their respective substantive notions  of fairness. In doing 
so, we employ Ronald Dworkin’s terms “brute luck” and “option luck”, not necessarily as an 
endorsement of his theory of DJ, but rather because the terms usefully illustrate the normative 
distinctions various theories make—as a matter of fairness—between personal responsibility and
undeserved misfortune. Dworkin defines “option luck” as “a matter of how deliberate and 
calculated gambles turn out” whereas “brute luck” is “a matter of how risks fall out that are not 
in that sense deliberate gambles”5 We find the brute-option luck distinction a useful heuristic 
device for understanding how different theorists of justice make determinations between 
personal and collective responsibility according to the substantive criterion of fairness he or she 
proposes. We will not take a position on where the line between brute and option luck should be 
drawn, we employ the distinction to argue that wherever that line is found, fairness requires we 
negate the unacceptable operation of brute luck. 
4
 For a description of the categorical distinction between CJ and DJ, see Ernest Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 
62-70 (Harvard University Press 1995). Although not all corrective justice theorists see CJ as categorically distinct 
from DJ, most see the inability of a CJ theory to distinguish itself from DJ as a fatal theoretical flaw for any 
plausible conception of CJ. See  Jules Coleman, Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions, in Analyzing Law: 
New Essays in Legal Theory 257-321, at 307-316 (Brian Bix ed., University Press 1998); Stephen Perry, The 
Distributive Turn: Mischief, Misfortune and Tort Law, in Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory 141-162 
(Brian Bix ed., University Press 1998). Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to 
Distributive Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 515, 528 (1992); Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility and the Law 
(Cambridge University Press 1999).
5
 Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality. Part 2: Equality of Resources, Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol. 10 Issue 4, 
283, 293 (1981).
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Corrective, retributive and distributive justice share a common egalitarian commitment 
that fairness requires treating people as equals. In general terms, fairness encompass the moral 
intuition, often expressed in egalitarian theories of justice, of persons as moral equals with a 
capacity and interest in being responsible for their lives. We will claim that all the forms of 
justice—corrective, retributive or distributive—are motivated by a concern for fair treatment 
which means respecting the idea of persons as moral equals, and as agents who deserve and 
desire to be responsible for their life choices and outcomes. 
Responsibility is both an aspect and a demand of the moral equality of persons, because it is 
a necessary concept to realize our shared aspiration to call our deeds and lives our own in a 
community of equals.6 Responsibility is what allows us to be authors of our own lives and realize 
our equal capacities for a sense of justice and “to have, to revise, and to rationally pursue a 
conception of the good”, to borrow Rawls’ terms.7
We are not arguing that brute luck and option luck are the best way to understand DJ,  RJ, or 
CJ. We only use luck as a heuristic device to talk about substantive notions of what we owe each 
other. In DJ, egalitarians debate the substantive question of how to realize a commitment to 
equality and responsibility by talking about what sorts of luck we should collectively negate to 
assure all persons have the same opportunity to pursue a full life.8 In RJ, philosophers debate the 
question of moral responsibility by talking about whether letting luck determine  the moral 
blameworthiness of a person is acceptable.9 In CJ, theorists debate how to properly formulate a 
concept of responsibility for (largely unintended) harmful actions or outcomes that grounds a
duty to compensate in morally acceptable terms. In all these theories of justice, the line between 
luck and responsibility is not determined by an empirical or metaphysical inquiry into whether or 
not something was “really” due to luck or under human control. Rather, it is determined by a 
normative argument about what sorts of things are reasonable to expect from people living in a 
6
 Jules Coleman makes a similar point about the importance of a concept of responsibility in a liberal society, not 
merely in terms of accountability, but as “the core of the liberal ideal: that if we are to have a certain concept of the 
individual as an agent, as a being who acts and is not merely acted upon, then it must be true that the individual can 
have a certain kin of ultimate responsibility for how his life goes.” Jules Coleman, The Practice of Principle, 60 
(Oxford University Press 2001).
7
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 18-19 (Erwin Kelly ed., Harvard University Press 2001).
8
 For a useful discussion see G.A. Cohen, The Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ethics 906, 916 (1989). 
9 See generally Michael J. Zimmerman, Luck and Moral Responsibility, Vol. 97 (Issue 2) Ethics, 374 (1987).
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shared world, in terms of rights and duties. In other word, these theories of justice seek not to 
eliminate the role of luck, but to confine its operation according to their own terms of fairness.10
III. Luck in Distributive Justice 
Egalitarianism is the prominent approach to distributive justice which seeks to reflect the 
equal moral worth and capacity for responsibility of persons by specifying fair social and 
economic structures.11 The question of fairness in DJ is how to structure the central institutions 
of society such that people, as moral equals, have substantially similar opportunities to pursue 
meaningful lives. Interestingly, major distributive justice theorists support the division of labor 
between private law (as the manifestation of CJ) and tax and transfer laws (as the manifestation 
of DJ).12 An argument for this view seems to be that redistribution through a DJ system is less 
restrictive of liberty and of our ability to choose a preferred path in life, than is redistribution via 
regulating bilateral interactions through private law.13
The notion of egalitarian fairness in DJ can be gleaned from looking at the types of 
questions debated among its theorists. First, theorist debate what DJ machine should operate 
10 Elizabeth Anderson has presented a compelling critique of formulating egalitarian commitments in terms of 
luck. Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 287 (1999).
 Anderson criticizes what she terms “luck egalitarians” who see the aim of DJ to be exclusively the 
compensation of undeserved misfortune with the surpluses of undeserved fortune. She criticizes this school for 
fetishizing the distinction between luck and choice over what she argues are the true aims of egalitarianism—to 
distinguish between those social relations which enable oppression and exploitation from those that positively 
ensure democratic equality and equal opportunity for functioning. Anderson claims that both luck and democratic 
egalitarians are committed to upholding personal responsibility. Luck egalitarians do so by only insuring against 
certain causes of losses (those due to brute luck), whereas democratic egalitarians do so by insuring against only 
certain types of losses (guarantees those “capacities necessary to functioning as a free and equal citizen and avoiding 
oppression” (id at 327). We find many of her critiques of luck egalitarianism compelling. We nonetheless are using 
luck as our heuristic device to talk about an egalitarian regime for dealing with accidents, because we think it is the 
most familiar heuristic to motivate notions of fairness. Thus, although our paper is formulated in the register of luck 
egalitarianism, we think that the substance of our argument could be reformulated in terms acceptable under 
Anderson's conception of democratic egalitarianism. Our argument in terms of democratic egalitarianism would be 
that, because interests in the “core”, namely to bodily integrity, are so essential to equal functioning, they are exactly 
the types of losses for which a democratic egalitarian would assure equal compensation, regardless of the source of 
destruction. We are thankful to Gregory Keating for bringing this point into our attention. 
11
 Another prominent approach is welfarism, as laid out by Louis Kaplow and Steve Shavell. See Louis Kaplow and 
Steve Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, (Harvard Universiy Press, 2002). While welfarism is, in some sense, an 
egalitarian theory, it is not driven by an egalitarian impulse, but rather by a welfare maximizing one.
12 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 274-80 (1971). See also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE ch.8 
(1986) (arguing that the concern of other people’s well-being is the responsibility of the government and not of the 
citizens in their daily transactions utilizing private property).   
13
 For a critique of this sort of liberty-based defense of tax-and-transfer rules as the exclusive domain of 
redistributive policy, see Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L. J. 472, 473 
(1980).
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upon; that is, what is the appropriate equalisandum (the thing to equalize)?14 Or, as Amartya Sen 
famously posed the question: “equality of what?”15  The responses from egalitarian theorists 
include: equality of “welfare,”16,“primary goods,”17 “resources,”18“access to advantage,”19
“opportunity for welfare,”20 “capabilities to achieve functioning,”21 and “capabilities for equal 
citizenship”22, to name a few.
With few notable exceptions, egalitarians disagree less about what should be left out of 
the DJ machine, than about the best “catchy” term for a single equalisandum that can capture all 
our widely shared intuitions about how a western egalitarian society should operate. 23 Theorists’ 
views can be seen as an attempt to explore an objective middle ground between purely focusing 
on people’s welfare and purely focusing on their resources, as the relevant equalisandum. 
Despite these differences, we believe few egalitarian theorists, if any, would disagree that bodily 
integrity falls within the core of interests that must be collectively insured, that is, inside the DJ 
machine. 
Assuming a given equalisandum, the second thing that liberal egalitarians debate is what 
limitations should be imposed on its distribution. What would justify a deviation from pure 
mathematical division of the equalisandum? Many DJ theorists, whether liberal egalitarians or 
libertarians, seem to agree that other considerations, such as liberty, responsibility, etc., come 
14
 G.A. Cohen says “an equalisandum claim specifies that which ought to be equalized, what, that is, people should 
be rendered equal in.” G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ethics 906, 908 (1989).
15
 Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values 307 (Stephen 
Darwall ed., 1995). The importance of the question, as Sen observes, lies in the fact that, for example, equal 
opportunities can correspond with very unequal income. Equal income can exist simultaneously with differences in 
wealth. Equal wealth can co-exist with unequal happiness. Equal happiness can go with divergent fulfillment of 
needs. And equal fulfillment of needs can be associated with different freedoms of choice. AMARTYA SEN, 
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 2 (1992). 
16
 John Roemer, Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare, 101 Q. J. ECON.  751 (1986).
17 RAWLS, supra note 9, at 62, 92.
18
 Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare; Part II: Equality of Resources 10 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 185, 311 (1981) (resources include mental and physical capacity).
19
  G.A. Cohen, The Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ethics 906, 916 (1989). 
20
  Richard Arneson, Equality and Equality of Opportunity for Welfare, 56 Phil. Studies 77  (1989).
21 SEN, supra note 18.
22
 Elizabeth Anderson, supra note 10.
23 See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Problems with Act-Utilitarianism and with Malevolent Preferences, in HARE AND 
CRITICS: ESSAYS ON MORAL THINKING, 89, 96-98 (Douglas Seanor & N. Fotion eds., 1988); And see also Kenneth 
Arrow, Some Ordinalist Notes on Rawls’ theory of justice, in KENNETH ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS 1, N. 104 
(Cambridge Mass, Harvard Univ. Press, 1983.  
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into play in answering this question.24 Although there is no consensus on what precise role 
justice dictates for responsibility, liberty or choice (to use some of the terms that have been 
employed) in distribution of the equalisandum, there is agreement that these considerations need 
to play some role.25 No matter what equalisandum we endorse, a commitment to liberty and 
responsibility requires us to make a distinction between differences in resources/primary 
goods/etc. arising from voluntary, informed choice, and those arising from individuals’ differing 
initial endowments of talent, wealth, opportunities, genes, or un-chosen social and environmental 
circumstances.26 In other words, a distinction should be made between “brute luck” and “option 
luck”, to use Dowrkin’s terms.27 The idea is to make an objective distinction between luck and 
responsibility with respect to one’s misfortunes.28 Bad luck is the individual’s problem if it is a 
result of her choices and ambitions; it is society’s  problem if it is a result of her un-chosen 
circumstances. Thus, most egalitarian DJ theorists attempt to design a distributive policy which 
is “endowment-insensitive” but “ambition-sensitive” which respect both equality and 
responsibility.29
Whether an agent’s particular action is a matter of choice, control, or chance (that is, the 
distinction between brute and option luck) might seem like a metaphysical question which 
involves a deep analysis of concepts of free will, causation and the like. Yet, in practice it is 
determined by standards of reasonableness, informed by culturally and temporally specific norms 
24
 For a short discussion of the way DJ theorists limit equalization of their equalisandum subject to these principles 
point see Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimality: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 
Tax L. Rev. 157, 161-164. 
25
 No theorist really claims that a static snapshot of people’s holdings is informative as to whether the society is just. 
Robert Nozick has distinguished between patterned and historical theories of justice. A patterned theory of justice 
evaluates holdings at a specific time. A historical theory, in contrast, looks at how the current pattern came about. 
Nozick argued for a historical theory of distributive justice, libertarianism; our argument in the text is that all 
theorists are to some extent concerned with the dynamic aspect of holdings, there is always concern for how the 
holdings came about. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 161-162 (1972).
26 See generally WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 75 (1990) 
(“People’s fate should depend on their ambitions in the broad sense of goals and projects about life, but should not 
depend on their natural and social endowments (the circumstances in which they pursue their ambitions).”).
27 See, Dworkin, supra note 5. Our conception of brute luck is somewhat broader than Dworkin’s, however.  For us, 
brute luck arises when an individual’s misfortune is not the result of a risk she could reasonably have avoided. See 
Logue and Avraham 161-165 (using the same conception of brute luck to analyze the optimal division of labor 
between tort law and tax and transfer law.) 
28
 When we employ “objective” we mean a standard that is fixed by publicly agreeable notions of reasonableness 
and representation, as opposed to a “subjective” standard which looks at something about the specific doer, such as 
intentions, control, etc.
29
 Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare; Part II: Equality of Resources 10 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 185, 293, 330 (1981); see also G.A. Cohen, The Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ethics 906, 908 (1989) 
(arguing that one of the primary egalitarian impulses is to extinguish the influence on distribution of brute luck).   
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of socially acceptable behavior. Like we stated above, the line between luck and responsibility in 
DJ is drawn by normative notions of what is fair for members of a political community to expect 
from one another. To illustrate the role of luck and control in our commonsense assessments of 
fairness in DJ, consider George who has declined to seek gainful employment and instead enjoys
the sands of Santa Monica as a full-time beach bum, and Harriett who was injured during service 
in the US military. Most would agree that, in 2005 in the United States, there is a fairly strong 
political consensus that abstaining from work when physically able is not a reasonable choice, 
and therefore someone who voluntarily decides to be a beach-bum does not have a legitimate 
demand on the State for income support to satisfy his consumer preferences. Military service, on 
the other hand has been constructed as reasonable choice, and therefore Veteran health care or 
income support programs which compensate for resultant injuries are considered legitimate 
distributive undertakings. 
To sum up, distributive justice egalitarians are mostly committed to fairness by creating 
institutions which allot equal amounts of welfare/opportunity/resource (the equalisandum), but 
also which reflect notions of responsibility. Responsibility in DJ entails holding people 
accountable for their choices, therefore immunizing them from misfortunes that either befall
them as a function of nature or while making reasonable decisions (brute luck), but not from 
misfortunes arising from unreasonable choices or informed gambles (option luck).30 This is how 
luck is dealt with in DJ. 
IV. Luck in Retributive Justice 
Luck is also an important concept in retributive justice (RJ). Retributive justice requires 
punishment of a wrongdoer in proportion to the gravity of the wrongdoer’s act towards the 
public and the victim . Retributive justice focuses on the moral responsibility of the doer and the 
punishment he deserves. In contrast, CJ focuses on restoring the fair terms of interaction between 
the doer and the sufferer through the assignment of legal responsibility, but ordinarily without 
30
 Jules Coleman makes this point well when he says: “In order to realize the idea of responsibility implicated in the 
concept of a life lived rather than a life had, political institutions must be arranged so that individuals’ lives reflect to 
a greater degree, or to the greatest possible degree, their choices rather than their circumstances of birth and the 
subsequent influences of fortune.” Coleman, supra note 6, at 60-61. 
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concluding anything about the moral worth of either. The doctrines of tort law compared to 
criminal law reflect this distinction. 31
The role of luck in RJ was famously explored by Bernard Williams and Tho mas Nagel.32
Thomas Nagel, in his seminal paper fittingly titled Moral Luck, brings to our attention the way in 
which “natural objects of moral assessment are disturbingly subject to luck”.33 Nagel argued that, 
in so far as we premise our judgments of moral responsibility on some notion of control—that 
people can only be held responsible for things reasonably within their control—most of these 
judgments are suspect. Because outcomes of actions are always, to a greater or lesser extent, 
consequences of causal forces outside the control of the actor, our moral assessment of an actor 
is always tainted by the role of forces beyond the actor's control . For Nagel, moral luck 
complicates the question of how to draw the line between “what is us and what is not, what we 
do and what happens to us, what is our personality and what is an accidental handicap.”34 Moral 
luck raises the question of why equally careless actors should be viewed as morally different if 
one party—such as D in our example (the one who hit the pedestrian)— occasions harm whereas 
another actor—such as E t(he one who missed her)—does not because of the presence or absence 
of a victim or a bird, a fact neither party had any control over. This is the moral luck paradox, as 
presented by Nagel. 
The moral luck paradox attracted immediate attention and has persisted as a conundrum 
for moral philosophers as well as to legal theorists, especially in the area of retributive justice
and criminal law. Some philosophers argue that the “successful” driver (D, the one who hit the 
pedestrian) is more morally blameworthy than the “unsuccessful” driver (E, the one who missed 
her), because the former caused harm while the latter did not. Yet other philosophers argue that 
D’s and E’s moral blameworthiness is identical: unsuccessful drivers are equally blameworthy as 
their successful counterparts because their failure is attributable to something outside their 
31
 Gerald Postema explains that "[r]etributive justice concerns the wrong, the wrongdoer's culpability, and the 
appropriate response of the public. Corrective justice focuses on the victim's loss and the claim to repair for that 
loss; it is not concerned with punishing, blaming, or exculpating the injurer, or with rectifying the wrong." Gerald J. 
Postema, Risks, Wrongs, and Responsibility: Coleman's Liberal Theory of Commutative Justice, 103 Yale L.J. 861, 
875 (1993).
32
  The papers, both entitled "Moral Luck," were originally published in The Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 
Volume 1, 1976.  Revised versions of this paper are included in the excellent anthology edited by Danny Statman. 
see Statman, D. (Ed.) (1993) Moral Luck. State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1-25.
33
 Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in Mortal Questions 60 (Cambridge University Press 1979).
34
 Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, supra note 33. 
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control.35 In general though, philosophers have come to a consensus on resolving the moral luck
paradox.36
Concepts equivalent to option luck and brute luck, more familiar in the DJ context, also play 
a role in the RJ. Consider Ilay who is a very careful driver who never exceeds the speed limit or 
violates norms of careful driving. One morning on his way to work he runs over a pedestrian 
who unexpectedly rushed into the road. Ilay was not blameworthy. In a way, he is outside of the 
scope of the moral luck paradox. His decision to drive carefully is reasonable, the fact that he 
killed a pedestrian is something which is beyond his reasonable control, and therefore he is 
immune from both civil and criminal liability.37 With respect to Harriett (who, recall, was injured 
in military service) and Ilay, RJ theorists and DJ theorists’ treatment of luck is similar. If one 
made a reasonable decision, the luck that strikes is “brute” and is therefore negated. For Harriett  
the costs of her bad luck, at least to some extent, are negated by society in general  (through 
compensation); Ilay’s bad luck of killing someone is negated because he is not forced to bear the 
costs by being held civilly or criminally liable. In both cases, theories of justice (and the law) 
treat the bad luck as brute luck: it is negated.38
The story becomes more complicated once option luck, and not brute luck is involved in 
brining about the outcome in question. Such is the case with examples D and E presented in the 
35
 Those who hold this view need to explain why the legal system treats both drivers so differently. This is the legal 
luck paradox. One of the most powerful responses is that epistemological shortcomings, and nothing else, is what 
prevents the legal system from imposing a punishment on the unsuccessful doer. The causation of harm signals the 
legally determinate level of carelessness or criminal intent which is uncertain in the cases of attempt or a victimless 
reckless act, because we can never know if, in the last instance, the person would not have exercised more care or 
abandoned the criminal enterprise.(The Model Penal Code imposes, in general, the same punishment for an 
unsuccessful attempt and the completed crime. Model Penal Code, section 5.05. Yet, it seems that most states don’t 
currently employ this policy.)  We find this response problematic because it seems to confuse two distinct stages in 
the criminal trial. The first is the finding of guilt, to which epistemological shortcoming are relevant. The second is 
the sentencing to which epistemological shortcomings are irrelevant. In the first stage,  paradoxically, the mens rea 
requirement to find someone guilty of an attempt to murder is sometimes higher than the mens rea requirement for 
murder. (Check MPP). In the second stage, the stage at which the convicted receives the sentencing “discount” for 
committing an attempt and not a completed crime, there are no epistemological shortcomings left. The court is 
presumably convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that the convict would have murdered the target; otherwise the 
court would not have convicted him in the first stage. Thus, it seems to us that epistemological shortcomings cannot 
explain the legal paradox. 
36
 The literature on the debate is infinite. Some of the recent literature includes, Stephen Morse, Reason, Results, and 
Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. Il. L. Rev. 363 (2004); Leo Katz, Why the Successful Assassin is More Wicked 
Than the Unsuccessful One, 88 Calif L. Rev. 791 (200); David Lewis, The Punishment that Leaves Something to 
Chance, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol 18(1), 63-57 (1989).
37
 We emphasize “reasonable” control because it was in his control in the sense that he could have chosen not to 
drive at all. But that would be an unreasonable demand of him. 
38
 Again, luck is a way of talking about a substantive notion of fairness, of what is appropriate to expect from others, 
of what constitutes reasonable behavior.
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Introduction. Both sped to work; both behaved unreasonably. D had bad luck to hit Amy and E 
had good luck not to hit anyone. Because their choice of speeding was unreasonable, the upshot 
of their actions can fairly be termed option luck. Just as George’s bad luck in being poor is 
considered option-luck because it is considered an unreasonable decision to be beach-bum, so are 
the casual upshots of D’s and E’s decision to speed considered option luck. 
But while DJ theorists agree more or less that option luck should not be negated, RJ theorists 
are divided on how to deal with option luck. Some argue that both D and E are equally morally
blameworthy, while others argue that they are not. This is the moral luck paradox described 
above.39
To sum up, both RJ and DJ theorists seem to agree that bad luck which comes after a
reasonable decision is “brute” and should be negated. In contrast, luck which comes after an
unreasonable decision is considered “option luck”. DJ theorists seem to not negate it, while RJ 
theorists are conflicted. These insights about the role of luck developed in RJ and DJ sit well 
with our intuitions about fairness as respecting equality and responsibility. In the next section we 
claim that these intuitions should be applied to misfortunes traditionally dominated by CJ.
V. Luck in Corrective Justice 
Corrective justice is concerned with the fair terms of responsibility in bilateral accidents. 
A doer hits a sufferer. We saw how DJ theorists treat sufferers’ luck: brute luck is negated but 
not option luck.40 We also saw how RJ theorists treat doers’ luck: brute luck is negated, and there 
is some debate with respect to option luck. In this section we argue that, although the role of luck 
in DJ and RJ (determining one’s fair share of society's resources in the former instance, and
one’s moral blameworthiness in the latter ) is different from the role of luck in CJ (determining
adequate liability of a wrongdoer and adequate compensation to the victim), there is a lot to be 
learned from the previous discussion. Specifically, we think that the principles of fairness in luck 
developed independently for doers and sufferers (in RJ and DJ, respectively) should inform
principles of liability and compensation in bilateral accidents.
39
  Indeed in the literature on moral luck there is some confusion whether both drivers should both to be blamed at 
the highest level as if they both killed a person, or, at the lowest level as if they both did not, or at some intermediate 
level. As Zimmerman observed Nagel seems to embrace the idea that both drivers deserve no blame at all. M. 
Zimmerman, Luck and Moral Responsibility, Ethics 97 (1987), 374 at 382. Zimmerman seems to argue, but he is 
somewhat vague on this point, that they both deserve the same level of the highest blame. Id 383-4. Zimmerman.
40
 Of course what is debated among DJ theorists is precisely what is properly considered brute, as opposed to option, 
luck. 
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Unfortunately, CJ theories have not been concerned with integrating these principles 
about luck and fairness developed in RJ and DJ in such a way that addresses discrepancies in 
liability and compensation identified in our initial examples of A-F. This is not to say that CJ 
theorists are unconcerned with luck. They are, but only with respect to the internal operation of 
CJ. Indeed, CJ theorists do talk about luck and responsibility as a way of distinguishing those 
losses for which a specific person is responsible, from those for which no one in particular is 
responsible, and therefore must lie where they fatefully fall (as a victim’s bad luck). Such is the 
case when a victim suffers injury from a non-negligent doer, and therefore can state no legal 
claim for compensation. Fairness in CJ also demands that one will not be able to escape 
responsibility for behavior which was under one’s control and caused harm to another. CJ 
theorists posit a “luck---control” spectrum which explains which losses are appropriately 
considered the doer’s, and which are the sufferer’s, to bear. Losses in which the doer's control
was a substantial factor (where the doer did not live up to the objective criteria of reasonable 
care), are ipso facto not the result of luck, and are therefore the doer's to alleviate.41
This is the principle of fairness in CJ. The doctrine of proximate cause in tort law 
manifests this principle of fairness by negating brute luck for doers. A doer is not responsible for 
the sufferer’s harm even if the doer was negligent, unless the harm was “caused” (proximately 
caused) by the doer’s negligence. One of causation most powerful operations is to shelter the 
defendant-doer from liability in cases where (bad) luck is the dominant factor which contributed 
to the plaintiff-sufferer’s harm. But why is luck a reason to exempt the doer from liability? It is 
because the doer did not cause the harm in the sense that the harm was not under his control: it is 
not fairly considered his responsibility. Finding the doer liable to the sufferer in cases where he 
lacked control strikes us as unfair. It is unfair, because the doer should not be held responsible 
for something that was not under his control.42
There is much more to be said about the role of luck in the internal operation of tort law. 
But for our purposes it is suffice to summarize that the instinct about negating brute luck appears 
41
 Different CJ theorists define these criteria of control differently. Steven Perry talks about control premised on 
capacity to avoid and foresight, see generally Steven Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk and the Law, in
Philosophy and the Law of Torts 73-123 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); Ripstein, supra note 4, at 94-109 (For a 
general discussion of the objective criteria of reasonable foresight).
42
 Of course, a tort where everything is under the doer’s control does not exist. Luck always plays some role. We are 
focusing on the cases where luck is the dominant factor which contributes to the harm. Compare In re Polemis & 
Furness, Withy & Co., 3 K.B. 560 with Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).
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in the internal operations of CJ, mainly in the doctrine of causation which diminishes the doer’s 
liability in cases where bad luck plays the most significant role.43
So in CJ, DJ and RJ, a lot of thinking was sunk into limiting the role of luck, because an 
active role for luck leaves us uncomfortable.44 Unfettered luck is perceived as introducing 
arbitrariness, contrary to the most fundamental understanding of the operation of justice. In all 
three theories of justice, it is control (the other side of luck in the spectrum) that we feel should 
determine outcomes, whether it is the moral worth of the doer and his punishment (RJ), civil 
liability and compensation (CJ), or her fair share in the social pie (DJ). Negating luck is the way 
by which RJ, DJ and CJ express their substantive commitment to fairness as respect for equality 
and responsibility. 
So why are we unsatisfied with the negation of luck within each of these forms of justice? 
We think there are two persistent ways luck continues to operate between the various spheres of 
justice that undermine the fairness of CJ and current schemes dealing with bilateral accidents. 
First, the luck of causation gives rise to vastly disparate treatment of equally careless actors 
(illustrated by cases D and E), and similar treatment of dissimilarly careless actors (illustrated by 
cases E and F). Second, the luck of source of misfortune gives rise to unequal treatment of 
equally blameless victims (illustrated by cases A through C).These two ways that luck continues 
to operate is why we think that the acoustic separation between forms of justice fails the global 
"fairness test."
Another way to put these concerns is as follows. What we need is an account of why the 
luck that is permitted to create the differential outcomes between A-B-C and then D-E, is an 
acceptable pattern of luck in terms of the first-order moral principles of fairness as equality and 
responsibility. To be sure, the mere operation of luck alone does not make an outcome unfair or 
arbitrary. Our claim is that the role luck is allowed to play in sorting cases of misfortune into the 
CJ versus DJ machines, as well as the role it plays in assigning liability to the unsuccessful 
negligent actors, is one which undermines the first-order commitments to equality and 
43Even in places where luck plays a secondary role the doctrine of causation is still active. It limits the doer’s 
liability to the extent that she, and not luck, caused the harm.
44
 In retributive justice, luck might determine the moral and legal status of the doer through the role of causation, or 
at least this is what philosophers have long been debating. But observe the potential opposite role of luck in CJ. In 
RJ luck is used to assign moral blameworthiness to the “unsuccessful” criminal who attempts a crime but the 
fortunate intervention of some causal force precludes the fruition of the criminal endeavor. In CJ, in contrast, luck is 
traditionally used to relieve the driver from responsibility. The doctrine of causation entails that if the sufferer’s 
harm was not caused by the doer’s wrongful act but rather by luck, the doer will not be held liable at all.
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responsibility CJ, DJ and RJ are based upon. We claim that, in so far as theorists are committed 
to fairness (by negating luck as a way to manifest notions of equality and responsibility) in the 
global sense—that is, not just equality and responsibility in the circumscribed realm of CJ, DJ or 
RJ—they must account for the morality of the luck that sorts cases into CJ or DJ or RJ’s types of 
analyses and the patterns of cost bearing it creates.
We are not arguing that CJ theorists fail to adequately eliminate the unfair operation of 
luck inside the operations of CJ or that its own terms of fairness are inadequate. Rather, we are 
saying that there is a principle of fairness which spans the divisions between various forms of 
justice. We think this global notion of fairness motivates us to formulate principles of 
distributive, corrective and retributive justice in the first place, and can be understood as a view 
of people as moral equals with an equal interest in responsibility.45 We feel it is not a useful 
project to try and conceptualize separate forms of justice that are insulated from each other when 
to do so violates this global notion of fairness. This is not to say that all forms of justice are 
reducible to a commensurate currency of fairness, but rather that any principle of justice which 
respects this global notion of fairness that we would want to choose to guide our approach to 
accidents will include distributive and retributive notions of fairness.
We now turn to examine in more detail the two ways in which luck plays an unfair role in 
determining liability and compensation. The following two Sections will develop our claim that  
the role luck plays, both inside the operation of tort law and in sorting cases into the institution of 
tort law violates egalitarian notions of fairness; it fails the fairness test. 
VI. Luck, Fairness and The Treatment of Equally Careless Actors 
 Cases D and E demonstrate the role of luck in determining vastly different liabilities for 
the same careless behavior. We claim that a global commitment to fairness cannot allow such a 
disparity in the assignment of liability to these two actors. We do not argue that doers such as D 
and E are morally indistinguishable, and therefore must be necessarily treated identically. We are 
45
 A formalist approach to CJ, such as that of Ernest Weinrib or Peter Benson, would of course reject the idea that 
there can be a principle of fairness at once external to CJ, which can therefore be employed to evaluate it, and 
internal to it as the standard of fairness articulated by its own normative structures. (We thank Ernest Weinrib in 
personal communication for this point). This objection however begs the premise of our initial argument, which is 
that there is a fundamental notion of fairness—that of treating people as equals and as having an interest in 
responsibility—which can and should inform justice in transactions (CJ) as well as justice in other contexts (such as 
in distribution). We do not argue that this broad, global notion of fairness gives us the contours of justice in all 
contexts, but merely that the operation of any form of justice— internally and considered in conjunction with other 
forms of justice—must at very least be fair according to those global terms. 
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not assessing the morality of the doers but the wrongfulness of their conduct. Rather, we claim 
that all careless action—irrespective of the causation of harm—is an appropriate object of 
concern for any principle of justice in transactions because all such action objectively disrespects 
the security interests of others by imposing unreasonable risks on them in pursuit of one’s own 
ends. Relying on causation of harm as a necessary determinate of liability is unfair because 
causation is primarily a function of luck.
We now explain this in more detail. There are two primary ways in which luck conditions 
the liability of similarly careless actors. First, there is the familiar issue of causation luck. 
Christopher Schroeder illustrates well the wrench moral luck—through the doctrine of 
causation—throws into CJ’s project of grounding tort law in some sense of moral responsibility. 
He reminds us that moral theories, in so far as they serve as guides to action46, usually concern 
themselves with the ex ante viewpoint, both judging actors and choices from the viewpoint of 
what they knew or should have known at the time of action.47 In this sense tort law is out of sync 
with most moral theories of responsibility because its cause-in-fact requirement employs an ex 
post viewpoint to make a moral assessment. The cause-in-fact requirement of tort law premises 
liability not on negligent action, but on the ex post “contingency of what causal chain actually 
materializes after [one] acts.”48  Schroeder argues that the conclusions of corrective justice—that 
the ‘successful’ negligent driver should be assessed full liability and ‘unsuccessful’ negligent 
drivers zero liability—are therefore morally arbitrary.
In the liability lottery, luck is not limited to the role of causation: the level of liability for 
which an actor might ultimately be held responsible also involves the lottery of victims. Hitting a 
victim with a frail, “eggshell” constitution or with high wages, will necessarily result in higher 
compensatory damages than similar impact with a more stalwartly constituted or low-income 
victim. Thus, the objective probability of causing a particular type of injury by a specific careless 
act may be equivalent between two similarly careless actors, but the expected harm from such an 
activity—the probability of injury times the magnitude of harm entailed in such an injury—
46
 Coleman makes a similar point about liberal political philosophy being directed at guiding action by providing 
criteria for judging between choices, saying “the fact that events affect individual welfare or well-being is 
normatively important because effects on individual welfare are the kinds of things that provide agents with reasons 
for acting.” Jules Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 53-71,54 
(David G. Owen ed., 1995).
47
 Christopher Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 440 (1990). 
48 Id., at 457.
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might not be equal. We might term this second operation of luck—the luck of hitting a 
particularly frail victim— “eggshell luck”. 49
Before we suggest our own two pennies on the causation lottery and the eggshell lottery, 
let us first explore how CJ theorists traditionally deal with moral-luck-like critiques. 
A common response to the apparent unfairness of luck’s role in manifesting massively 
different liability for similarly careless acts refocuses the question as one of ex ante as opposed 
ex post fairness. Such an argument defends the current practice of relying on causation luck to
determine liability for carelessness by casting the practice as one which exposes equally careless 
drivers to equal risk of liability. This argument casts th e causation lottery as fair from the ex-ante 
perspective, although it does not assure equal treatment from the ex post perspective. Therefore, 
if a careless driver’s actions expose other drivers around him to a 40% chance of injury, he 
himself is exposed to a 40% chance of financial liability for such injuries. Jeremy Waldron 
describes such an argument as a “liability lottery” in which causation does not necessarily have 
independent normative relevance in grounding the duty to compensate, but merely “happens to 
be the method we have adopted for ensuring that those who expose others to risks are exposed to 
substantially the same risk themselves.”50 It is easy to imagine how the ex ante fairness argument 
could just roll eggshell luck into causation luck: the lottery of liability is ex ante fair with respect 
to both kinds of luck because similarly careless drivers are being subjected to the exact same risk 
of damages as that to which they expose others. The existence of eggshell victims is an empirical 
fact that is already factored into the calculus of the liability lottery. The ex-ante perspective led 
Schroeder to advance a scheme of accident law where both careless drivers – the successful and 
the unsuccessful ones -- would be assessed equal monetary liability, which should be set at the 
level of expected harm of the negligent activity.51
We would like to make two points about the arguments describing the liability lottery as 
ex ante fair. First, although such an account might resolve some discomfort about the fairness of 
the comparative treatment of similarly careless drivers, it leaves untouched the question of the 
49
 We are thankful to Charles Taylor for raising questions about this other level of luck. 
50
 Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 387-408, 
407 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). 
51Schroeder, supra note 47, at 472. Schroeder distinguishes his proposal from ‘communal or group responsibility’ 
because “the ex ante proposals advanced here are predicated on individual, private morality, arguing only that 
implementation can be done in nontraditional litigation structures” to conform more closely with moral notions of 
accountability and eliminate the “lottery” character of liability based on outcomes as opposed to faulty actions.
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absolute appropriateness of our current practice of assessing either full (when causation strikes) 
or zero (when careless action luckily eludes victims) liability.52 This question is especially salient 
in cases where eggshell luck is at work—or, to borrow Jeremy Waldon’s terms—where 
“moments of carelessness” cause massive damages. Therefore, causation and eggshell luck give 
us occasion to question the motivation for limiting ourselves to accident schemes in which the 
only possibilities are zero liability or full liability. 
Secondly, assume we are satisfied that any claim of unfair treatment by a successful 
careless driver (who is made to pay full liability) in relation to an unsuccessful careless driver 
(who pays nothing), is resolved by reference to the ex ante identity of the liability lottery faced 
by careless drivers to the risk lottery faced by their potential victims. This does not satisfy us
with respect to the claims of unfair treatment by careful drivers in relation to unsuccessful 
careless drivers. From the point of view of careful drivers, such as our case F (who consistently 
drives carefully and has occasioned no harm to others), it may be fair to hold successful careless 
drivers liable for full damages, yet unfair to allow unsuccessful careless drivers (such as E who
consistently drives carelessly and also occasions no harm) to be treated identically to careful 
drivers, escaping any fine or liability. We argue that the foundational values of CJ should lead us 
to be unsatisfied with relying exclusively on causation to audit careless action because it under-
enforces the norms of responsible action which respects others’ security interests as equally 
important as one’s own. 
Another version of this ex ante fairness argument as a justification for the current regime 
is framed in terms of a single, reoccurring actor engaging in careless activity, as opposed to 
comparing two different similarly situated careless actors. Tony Honore offers such an account 
for why charging the “successful” driver but not the “unsuccessful” driver is not unfair.53 Rather 
than comparing two different drivers, he asks us to think of these two drivers as two different 
versions of our own selves. In the long run, the current tort system is a fair lottery, Honore 
argues, because most of the time my ‘unsuccessful driver self’ is not found liable and therefore 
52
 Jeremy Waldron makes this point from the perspective of moral desert of careless actors. He says that although 
the liability lottery may be “macabrely appropriate”, it is not necessary that we achieve compensation of victims by 
a system that imposes a liability lottery where the outcomes are either substantial liability or zero. He claims that if 
we can find better ways of compensating victims then, “imposing this risk on negligent persons will seem 
unnecessarily retributive and arbitrary, in the sense of being insufficiently motivated by any good reason.” Waldron, 
supra note 50, at 406.
53
 Tony Honore, Responsibility and Luck: The moral Issues of Strict Liability, 104 law Quarterly Review 530 
(1988). 
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does not pay for her behavior. Whenever my “successful careless driver self” is found liable, and 
therefore is required to pay damages, it is just the debit side of a long run credit accumulated in 
the multiple-selves personal account. Since the credit and debit tend to even out in the long run, 
it is not unfair to charge the successful and the unsuccessful driver differently. We disagree for 
several reasons. 
First, as Ripstein noted, to assume that the credit and the debit parts in each person’s life 
will always cancel out is a very optimistic empirical assumption. It assumes a perfect correlation 
between harm creation and risk creation. The more harm a driver causes (and therefore is 
required to pay more damages) the more we need to assume that he must have escaped liability 
for risk creation; otherwise the credits and the debits will not cancel out. Harm creation and risk 
creation may be correlated, but not necessarily perfectly so. For example, two doers can impose 
the same risk but due to pure eggshell luck, one creates more harm than the other. It is exactly 
this luck with which we are concerned that Honore’s argument leaves unsettled. Moreover, (and 
again as an empirical matter) as Risptein observed, if someone starts by compensating another, 
she may never get the chance to impose risks on others.54 Second, it is hard to reconcile 
Honore’s claim that both driver are treated fairly with the fact that F, as the consistently careful 
driver, would definitely have a claim in justice against being treated identically to E who 
consistently drivers recklessly but always escapes liability on account of luck alone. Third, and 
more importantly, even if Honore is correct empirically, and even if his system is fair (in the 
long run) it may still be the case that one can think of a system which is, also in the long run, 
even more fair because it is not only fair from the ex-ante perspective, but also from the ex-post 
perspective. This is what we try to do.
Another familiar way CJ theorists address this apparent unfairness of unequal treatment 
of equally careless actors is by reminding us that corrective justice is not concerned with the 
assessing the moral status of negligent actors, but rather with fairly assigning responsibility to 
the consequences of the careless actions. For example, Coleman argues that CJ deals with 
“objective” wrongdoings which do not necessarily “mark a moral defect in the agent,” and 
therefore, the duty to repair wrongful losses is not because the injurer is wrong, but rather 
54
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because the wrongful loss is the doer’s responsibility, “the result of his agency”. 55 Ripstein 
agrees that liability must be assigned in accordance with morally acceptable norms of 
responsibility, but rejects the idea that “lack of care should be the relevant dimension along 
which similarly situated people [should be] treated alike.”56 For Risptein, “[t]he failure to 
exercise appropriate care is one moral failing among others”, and it is not clear what the rationale 
is for classifying people as relevantly similar along that dimension compared to other possible 
moral failings.57 Again, because CJ is making an objective inquiry into the wrongness of an 
action, not an actor, the fact that others are equally blameworthy in a moral sense is not relevant. 
Ripstein explains that, negligence is not a sign of moral defect, but rather “a failure of conduct”, 
and CJ does not set out to “ensure like treatment of all bad behavior”, but rather to assign the 
costs of negligent accidents fairly.58
If we grant that CJ is not concerned with the moral evaluation of actors, and rather 
concerned with assigning liability on the basis of objectively faulty actions, does the moral luck 
critique still offer us anything? We think the answer is yes.
We will make three points to support this claim. First, with respect to the faulty action 
versus faulty actor distinction made by various CJ theorists, we think this is an important 
distinction which, we in fact endorse. However we believe it can be applied more coherently 
than CJ theorists do in defending the current tort law system. We are not proposing that D and E 
should be treated exactly alike because they are moral equals, but rather that their similar defect 
of conduct—their similar wrong in disrespecting the security interest of others—should trigger a 
similar concern, though not necessarily an identical remedial response. In fact, we are, just like 
CJ theorists, not fixating on the doers’ moral worth. We also care about the faulty action and not 
the faulty actor, only we do not condition our inquiry on the misfortune of harm.
The operation of luck illustrated by our examples D and E demonstrates that sorting cases 
into the CJ machine happens in such a way that is under-inclusive of egalitarian foundational 
commitments to negating luck to manifest equality and responsibility. Indeed, there are others 
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who manifest this same defect of conduct, namely unsuccessful careless actors, who escape any 
consequences for their action. The principle of equal respect to others’ liberty and security 
interests, embodied in the standards of care of tort law, can be used to evaluate all action, 
including action which does not cause harm. As Schroeder points out, describing some action as 
faulty presupposed a “hypothetical imperative”; in CJ such an imperative might say that “if you 
want to treat others as equals, you must exercise appropriate care in your interactions with 
others” and action is faulty when it does not comport with this imperative. He points out 
therefore that ‘faulty’ can “identif[y] an aspect of actions that can be present regardless of 
whether harm is caused in any specific instance.”59 To use his example, faulty free-throw form 
can still be described as ‘faulty’ even if it makes 25% of the shoots. Indeed, in order to use 
objective wrongdoing (fault) to morally ground the duty to hold D liable but absolve E of any 
costs, it must mean something more than just a “redescription of the fact that the action has 
caused harm.”60
Our second point is that we think that to use faulty action to ground the duty to 
compensate implies that we should be concerned with all such faulty action, even if it luckily 
does not cause harm. The normative role of faulty action in justifying the duty to compensate 
implies a concern about such action—because it does not show respect for the interests of others 
as equal to one’s own interests—that must be somewhat independent of the fact harm is caused 
in some instances. Most CJ theorists defend the fault principle over strict liability precisely 
because they do not see the occasion of harm as a causal upshot of agency as morally sufficient 
to ground the duty to compensate. Drawing from the literature on moral luck, we think that the 
existence of harm may solve an epistemological problem we may have (but may not necessarily 
have) in detecting faulty behavior. Harm, in other words, is a sufficient, but is not a necessary, 
starting point for our inquiry about the doer’s behavior. This is not to say that all similarly faulty 
action ever can be treated identically, merely that our inquiry into fair treatment of careless 
actors should not be limited to the cases where harm manifests. 
Of course the fact that harm did occur is relevant to CJ. Corrective justice theorists would 
respond to our discomfort about the unequal treatment of D and E, despite their relevant 
similarity, by reminding us that, in the case of E there was no victim. The now near consensus on 
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the centrality of correlativity in CJ shows that the existence of a victim is not merely an occasion 
to evaluate a doer’s action, but a fundamental component of the inquiry into the principle of 
justice. If there is no mess to clean up, there is no occasion to ask the question of CJ: who should 
bear the costs of this misfortune? As Weinrib puts it, “tort law is not concerned solely with the 
defendant’s emission of a harmful possibility but with that possibility’s coming to rest on a 
particular plaintiff.”61 Therefore causation does not as much particularize the defendant as a 
uniquely blameworthy doer, as it particularizes the plaintiff as the appropriate recipient of 
compensation for the losses attributable to the wrongdoer’s carelessness. Rectification of 
wrongful losses therefore restores the initial equality between the plaintiff and defendant. 
Although the operation of CJ rectifies the wrong between that specific doer and sufferer, 
we claim that the wrongful “emission of a harmful possibility” by the unsuccessful actor is still 
an outstanding matter of social concern. The response of CJ to concern over the comparative 
treatment of D and E does not so much justify the unequal treatment, as much as it begs the 
question of the sufficiency of the limited question posed by CJ to this situation. That is, the fact 
that we do nothing with E but assess D’s liability is the result of the theoretical and institutional 
segregation of CJ and RJ, not because there are not relevant questions to ask in the case of E, 
questions that are motivated by the same concern for equality and responsibility as the CJ 
question.
This is not to say that the normative criteria of fault in corrective justice should or can be 
collapsed into the criteria of moral blameworthiness in retributive justice. Rather, retributive 
principles may constrain and inform our actions in the traditional CJ realm. Various theorists 
have argued that retributive principles should constrain the operation of CJ in several respects. 
For example, Tony Honore and Jeremy Waldon have both explored how the retributive principle, 
which forbid imposing sanctions massively out of proportion to the gravity of an offense, might 
demand some sort of loss spreading mechanism (such as insurance), and abandonment of “zero 
or full” liability schemes.62 Moreover, The retributive principle which require imposing 
sanctions in proportion to blameworthiness may also inform our actions in the traditional CJ 
realm because all careless action, whether or not it manifests in harm, disrespect the security 
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interests of others and therefore is of some social concern.63 While consideration of retributive 
principles will not give us a precise formula for the liability we should impose on careless 
behavior, they do point our consideration to actors such as E, who escape liability because he 
caused injuries to no specific victim, but who nonetheless flaunt social norms of careful conduct 
putting others at risks, and generate very real general social costs.
The reasons why cases D and E are not problems for CJ are internal to CJ, and 
demonstrate that global considerations of luck do not pose a problem for the coherency of the 
theory. We agree that many CJ theorists offer resolutions of moral-luck-like objections about
disparities in liability that are internally coherent to CJ. We just believe internal coherency is not 
sufficient in the face of patent unfairness that results from segregated, even if internally coherent, 
spheres of justice. We claim that CJ theorist cannot stop with giving a coherent account internal 
to their own theory, they must deal with the global problem of fairness that is created by 
maintaining a distinction between CJ and RJ if they simultaneously hold commitments to global 
fairness. Therefore, in sum, our second point is that to focus on harm as the exclusive trigger for 
liability belies maintaining that the CJ-RJ distinction is valued over, what in our view should be, 
a lexically prior commitment to global fairness. 
Our third point (which  is logically distinct from the previous points) for why  all careless 
conduct should be an object of social/normative concerns is that the unsuccessful negligent 
driver does actually occasion harm to society. This social harm is ignored under CJ. By behavi ng 
without care, D has violated the norm of responsibility, the foundational value of CJ which 
demands we all show equal regard and respect for the interests of others, and by doing so he has 
imposed costs on others in his sphere of action. Except in intentional torts , in most accidents the 
identity of the victim is determined by a lottery. Actors such as our example D (who consistently 
drives carelessly) does interfere with many other people’s plans, he does impose costs on other 
people in terms of their liberty. Other drivers, like F (who consistently drive carefully.), need to 
change their behavior by showing extra care and caution on the road as D menaces their security 
interests with his car. It seems that once we are committed to the standard of care as a 
manifestation of a specific responsibility to show concern for the others’ security interest in a 
given realm, it is arbitrary to restrict consequences to only those who are unlucky enough to 
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cause harm. We think that the fact that unsuccessful negligent actors have violated the norms of 
equal terms of interaction, in conjunction with the fact that this forces others to compensate for 
their disregard, would lead those committed to a global notion of fairness (understood as 
commitment to equality and responsibility by negating brute luck) to think such actors should be 
assessed at least some level of liability for their actions (although not necessarily the same level 
of liability as a successful actor).64
The proceeding discussion was dedicated to interrogating the moral acceptability of the 
role of luck in liability. So far our comments have focused on critiquing the role luck is permitted 
to play in tort law as both intuitively unfair in several respects, and as contrary to the 
foundational commitments of corrective justice to equality and responsibility. Causation luck and 
eggshell luck make us question the fairness and appropriateness of a system where similarly 
careless actors are either subject to full (and often massive) liability, or zero liability, depending 
on something outside of their control—the placement of a victim and/or the physical 
characteristics of that victim. We believe the relying exclusively on causation to audit careless 
action under-enforces the very foundational values of CJ and belies a theoretical weakness of CJ, 
an unnecessary concern with maintaining an acoustic separation from related principles of 
justice, namely RJ. We have argued that CJ posits careless action as a normative concern, 
independent of its ripening into harm to another, and that notions of desert, traditionally 
relegated to the RJ realm, do enter into our commonsense judgments about how we should 
design a scheme which both compensates accident victims and holds those who create risks and 
harms accountable.  
As a normative matter, luck alone cannot give us the contours of proper practice. As in 
current tort doctrine, liability is not determined by the physics of causality, but rather by  settled 
notions of what we duties of care owe each other, and when we think certain risks are reasonably 
within the foresight and control of actors. In the last section we will develop these points further, 
but for now we would like to suggest that our discussion of luck would lead us to conclude that 
any acceptable scheme of accident law inside an acceptable “zone of fairness” would (1) involve 
some assessment of liability to unsuccessful careless actors and (2) consider assessing less than 
full damages to those successful careless actors whose level of carelessness is massively out of 
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proportion to the harm ultimately caused because of the ‘eggshell’ characteristics of their 
victims. Several schemes, including the one advanced by Schroeder where all similarly careless 
actors are charged expected harm, or a mixed scheme where successful careless drivers are 
charged close to full damages and unsuccessful are charged expected harm, would fall in the 
“zone of fairness”. We are not proposing constructing a perfect scheme in which all luck is 
negated, assuming it would even be possible to do so. To make such a proposal begs the initial 
question, which is not whether luck has played a role in determining an outcome, but rather 
whether luck has played a morally acceptable role. Fairness, like reasonableness in the law, is a 
zone whose boundaries are set by foundational commitments to substantive notions of equality 
and responsibility. 
We now turn to the other area where, in our view, luck is allowed to play a morally 
unacceptable role in the current tort regime. 
VII. Luck, Fairness and The Treatment of Equally Blameless Victims 
Symmetric to the CJ – RJ divide we discussed above, there is a CJ – DJ divide which 
allows a morally unacceptable role for luck in determining treatment of equals on the side of 
victims. Although the unequal treatment of equally innocent victims has been given less attention 
in the literature, it poses an equally significant problem as that of equally negligent actors for CJ 
theorists who are also committed to a global notion of fairness.65 Consider again the cases of A, 
B and C’s misfortune. In each of these cases the compensation available to the victim is entirely 
a function of luck. That is, in none of the examples was the victim to blame for his or her 
misfortune; they are similar cases in that they are all blameless victims of some exogenous force. 
Only luck, brute luck, determines whether the harm was caused by an agent or by nature, and 
only brute luck determines the level of insurance carried by their respective tortfeasor. But while 
the attempt to nullify the role of brute luck in the unfortunate vicissitudes of life is a major issue 
in the DJ literature and the political institutions proposed therein, there is no similar concern in 
the CJ literature. (As we saw above, CJ is occupied with negating luck, but only to internally 
immune doers from liability). Paradoxically, major political theorists support the division of 
labor between CJ and DJ, thus ignoring the crucial role that luck plays sorting people into the CJ 
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or DJ machine in the first place. We claim that lack of control for victims is a relevant vector of 
similarity to the lack of control for defendants (which the CJ machine does recognize). There is 
no principled reason to make a distinction between the compensation due equally blameless 
victims on the basis of the cause of that loss. Therefore, it offends justice that they have so vastly 
distinct prospects for compensation.66
Our concern in this paper is with equal compensation for injuries to bodily integrity, an 
object of normative concern in RJ, DJ and CJ alike. If CJ theorists are committed to protecting 
the specific interests protected by the standards of care in tort doctrines, then there seem to be no 
a-priori principled reason to distinguish between the sources of destruction of these interests in
assuring innocent victims recourse to compensation.67 We argue that all persons who suffer the 
destruction of an interest in bodily integrity should be equally compensated, regardless of their 
ability to ascribe such loss to another human agent. This relevant similarity of equally blameless 
victims is necessitated by the first-order commitments of egalitarianism, that persons should 
have equal opportunity to pursue a meaningful life and to be responsibility for the outcomes of 
their life, in combination with our substantive argument that source of one’s injury is not a 
morally acceptable role for luck to play. Of course, the question of which kinds of losses should 
be compensated is not obvious from this approach. As we mentioned above, what sorts of 
interests are essential to allow people equal opportunity to lead a meaningful life is a normative 
66
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question, one which DJ theorist have debated at length, and on which we offer no particular view
in this paper. 
Again, some CJ theorists do not justify or even defend this unequal treatment of innocent 
victims. Rather, they point to division of labor between CJ and DJ and claim that cases such as 
A-C, on account of the source of misfortune, simply sort themselves out into different schemas 
of justice. This is not a justification of the disparate treatment as much as it is a description of it. 
As in the question of unequal treatment of equally negligent actors, it begs the question of why 
we start from the position of an a priori commitment to a division of labor between CJ and DJ if 
it comes at the price of generating such inequalities? If corrective justice is fair and treats people 
as equals, it must do so not only internally, but also in terms of how people get into the CJ 
system in the first place. Yet, most theorists have claimed that the internal rules of corrective 
justice take care of this: that the rules for deciding if something qualifies as faulty action or a 
wrongful loss and therefore deserves to be sorted to the CJ machine, do not pose a problem for 
fairness. 
Recently, some theorists have relaxed the restriction of distributive considerations in CJ. 
Various theorists assert that the normative strength of CJ claims is influenced by the fairness of 
the underlying holdings CJ protects from wrongful transfer.68 In this view, the CJ machine stalls 
only when the underlying distributive shares are disturbingly distant from the demands of 
distributive justice. They would refuse Marie Antoinette’s claim for her tortiously trampled torte, 
but might not refuse much beyond that.  
However, we are claiming something more, that the actual rules for distinguishing 
between what is in the sphere of corrective versus distributive justice, as they currently function 
in our tort system, produce outcomes incompatible with an egalitarian commitment to fairness. 
Most CJ theorists hold that CJ is a distinct, independent system, and that there are reasons it 
should remain so.69 We not turn to exploring some of the reasons that have been offered in 
defense of this proposition. 
How and Why are Corrective and Distributive Justice Distinct? 
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Recall our argument that there is no fundamental concept or value upon which we can 
justify the normative necessity of a distinction between CJ and DJ. That is not to say that the 
distinction cannot be analytically made, but rather that it must be evaluated and justified in the 
same way any human construct is evaluated—with reference to values we share.70 The real 
question is therefore why we would want to maintain such a distinction. Although we will direct 
most of our comments in the following sections to the debate around how and why CJ is distinct 
from DJ (mainly because there has been a significant literature on this distinction), may of our 
arguments are meant generally to be about why CJ is a distinct and insulated principle of justice, 
from either DJ or RJ.
Harms by Agents vs. Harms by Nature
One common way in which corrective justice theorist justify the division of labor 
between CJ and DJ is with reference to the sphere of human action upon which they operate. 
Many theorists have characterized CJ as operating on agent-created misfortune, while DJ 
operates on those misfortunes brought about by acts of nature or by the normal, acceptable 
operation of political, economic or social institutions.71 This distinction is ‘true’ in a tautological 
sense that we now describe the subject of tort law as a non nature-human occasioned harm. But 
even where nature had a primary role in causing harm—for example in the case of the hurricane 
Katrina—there are always ways to describe the harm in such a way that an act or omission of a 
human agent also contributed to it, say by not allocating sufficient resources to strengthen the 
levees of a nearby lake. Thus, where we draw the line between acts of man and acts of God 
determines, and is not determined by, the boundaries of tort law as we know it. And this 
decision—where to draw the line—should pass the fairness test, or at least so we argue.  
Moreover, even where a harm was clearly caused by an agent, the misfortune is not 
necessarily sorted into the CJ machine. Consider two examples. Various institutions of 
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distributive justice also operate on misfortunes occasioned by human conduct. GM shuts down 
operations in Flint Michigan, a very specific act of human agency, and thousands of devastated 
workers seek compensation for various institutions of DJ: unemployment, food stamps, job 
training, etc. In this case the condition of human agency and causality is satisfied. Or, to take a 
more recent example, when hurricane Katrina hit the southern coast of the U.S and hundreds of 
thousands were economically harmed (ignoring the thousands of tragic deaths for a second) we 
usually do no think that all those victims have a right to compensation from anyone in particular. 
At best, we think they might have a sound plea for charity, even if a major reason for their loss is 
that resources to strengthen the levees of a nearby lake were negligently shifted, by humans, to a 
different place. 
Second, tort law (the institutional manifestation CJ) does not fully take care of one’s 
losses even once it recognizes the course of events as providing grounds for a legitimate claim. 
If, after you are laid off by GM you express your frustration by punching the GM CEO, he will 
be able to recover parts of his losses, but not those considered as pure economic losses.72
The reasons neither of these misfortunes is sorted into institutions of CJ are not because 
of the feature of human agency, but rather because of some formal rule internal to corrective 
justice: that of duties and correlative rights. Put differently, the reason this misfortune is not 
sorted in the CJ machine, has to do with the structure of CJ. Because welfare is not a correlative 
concept, then, at least under Weinrib’s formulation, the sufferer (the fired GM employee and 
victims of Katrina) has no exclusive right to her specific level of welfare, she has no right for a 
specific stream of income, and therefore the doer has no correlative duty to protect it.73
Therefore, it is not some fundamental concept of human agency which gives boundaries to CJ; 
rather the boundaries are determined by the form of rights internal to CJ which underlie the 
victim’s claim. 
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The nature of CJ as a distinctive principle of justice operating on the realm of human 
occasioned harm is also expressed in Coleman’s concept of responsible agency and Perry’s 
concept of outcome-responsibility. Coleman’s concept of responsible agency is the principle of 
CJ which “provides wrongdoers with reasons for acting that are peculiar to injurers …to annul 
losses for which they are responsible.”74 Perry formulates the distinctive nature of CJ in terms of 
outcome responsibility. He advocates for a notion of “responsibility premised on control 
[capacity to avoid]…[as a] normative connection between actor and outcome”.75  In both 
Coleman’s and Perry’s accounts, the concepts of responsible agency and outcome responsibility 
explain the differential treatment of A-C and D-E coherently because they posit the “relevant 
principle of responsibility as ‘responsibility for outcomes’ not ‘responsibility for acts’.76
While both Coleman and Perry’s accounts certainly provide a coherent distinction 
between CJ and DJ, it does not provide a compelling reason for maintaining the distinction if 
doing so compromises respecting its constitutive commitments, that of equal enforcement of 
responsible agency and annulment of wrongful losses. But again, their accounts deal only with  
how the operations of CJ are fair once something is subject to CJ. The unfairness might emerge 
when we step back and look at why certain cases are being sorted between the CJ and DJ 
machines in the first place. For us, the question is not whether we can draw a coherent distinction 
between CJ and DJ on the basis of a concept related to human agency, harm, or responsibility, 
but rather if we should want to and why. A global commitment to fairness and the negation of 
brute luck that it entails (again, as a way to manifest equality and responsibility), demands we do
not segregate our thinking in the matter of getting people their due compensation and enforcing 
responsible terms of interaction. It demands we take into account the interaction between 
institutions and theories of DJ and CJ, not just content ourselves with answers such as “but that is 
a concern of distributive, not corrective justice” or visa-versa. We argue that the current theories 
which circumscribe corrective justice with the above mentioned concepts are under-inclusive of 
both the conduct and misfortunes that fairness demands we address. 
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Thick vs. Thin Concept of Personality 
Another important distinction between corrective and distributive justice is the role a 
concept of ‘personality’ plays in the respective theories. For example, in Weinrib’s theory of CJ, 
the notion of correlativity operates on the structure of CJ, whereas the notion of personality 
operates on the substantive content of the rights and duties relevant to CJ. In CJ, personality is 
“thin” because it merely entails that “parties are viewed as purposive beings who are not subject 
to a duty to act for any purpose in particular, no matter how meritorious.”77 Their only duty is a 
negative one- not to interfere with others’ life paths. This “thin” concept is limited, according to 
Weinrib, only to private law. In other contexts, such as in DJ, the concept of personality is 
“thicker”, it extends beyond the negative duties of non-interference to accommodate larger sets 
of duties related to the richer realms of social interactions beyond that of a specific doer and a 
specific sufferer.78
But, as Weinrib emphasizes, his theory of CJ does not postulate a conception of 
personality and then derive tort theory from it. Rather, it works backward from the doctrines and 
institutions of tort law to the most pervasive abstractions (correlativity and personality) implicit 
in it. For Weinrib, tort law is the normative practice, and personality, together with correlativity, 
serve as vehicles to illuminate the normative practice of tort law.79 There are no independent 
normative justifications for these concepts, only instrumentalist ones; together they make a 
coherent, but completely internal, understanding of tort law feasible. Weinrib’s analysis says 
nothing on whether a world with tort law in it should exist; it is orthogonal to the plane on which 
his theory operates. He only claims that there is only one way (his way) to describe what tort law 
is about, he does not claim it should exist. Indeed, our main argument is that, a normative 
commitment to fairness less constrains the content and application of CJ institutions,80 as it raises 
doubts about the legitimacy of these institutions altogether as a way of dealing with accidents. 
Peter Benson has also used the concept of personality to advance a categorical distinction 
of corrective from distributive justice. He has argued that “corrective justice must be viewed as 
77 Weinrib, Emerging Consensus, supra note 73, at 111. 
78 Id. 
79 Ib., at 125. 
80 For how commitment to fairness may constrain the content and application of CJ institutions, see Logue & 
Avraham, supra note 29.
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lexically prior to distributive justice.”81 Benson, a close intellectual cousin of Weinrib’s formalist 
conception of CJ, acknowledges that “once the initial entitlement is grounded in distributive 
justice… there is no need to introduce, and indeed no basis for referring to, a second, genuinely 
distinct form of justice such as corrective justice”.82 As such, he postulates notions of entitlement 
and equality that are non-distributive in nature. Like Weinrib, Benson’s conception of 
personality is thin.83 For him distributive justice takes into account various features of 
personality relevant for a particular criterion of distribution (such as desert, need, etc.),whereas 
corrective justice completely abstracts from all such features. People are not viewed as sharing in 
social a community, but rather as individuals who owe each other negative duties of non-
interference with each other’s rights. A right, in non-distributive terms is cognizable under CJ if 
the person “through an external manifestation of will, has brought something under his or her 
present and exclusive control prior to others.”84
The duties a thin conception of personality entail can be simply characterized as: do 
nothing that can possibly constrain or otherwise interfere with another's rightful exercise of his 
or her capacity to use things, that is, with what Benson calls the other’s ‘abstract right’.85 Benson 
claims this bare and minimal conception of the person is fundamentally distinct from the more 
complex notion of the person that underlies theories of distributive justice.
But why does Benson desire such a “thin” concept of personhood that is wholly 
independent of any reference to a shared conception of good or right? After all, individuals are 
inescapably particular, and inextricably social. Isn’t it a wrong move to abstract from the reality 
of agency in a shared world into a hypothetical world of abstract will and abstract right, 
especially when we eventually need to move back into the reality of a more particular world to 
enforce those claims formulated in the abstract?86 Benson does not deny that agents are 
differentiated by their particularities, only the significance of this from a moral standpoint. Under 
his conception of CJ, persons in transactions are not thought of as being members of a social 
81 Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 515, 528 
(1992).
82 Ib., at 531.
83 “Whether a person has rendered or received what is due in terms of holdings can be determined without reference 
to the ends he or she may have, and thus independently of such considerations as intention or character which are the 
defining concern of the other virtues.” Ib., at 535. 
84 Id., at 543.
85 Id., at 572.
86
 Charles Taylor,  'Atomism', in Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (eds.), Communitarianism and Individualism
(Oxford Univ Press, 1992). 
Accident Law for Egalitarians
38
whole, mutually related through common claims or burdens. Rather, “what persons 'share' in 
abstract right is simply an identical permission to use things to the exclusion of others”87
But isn’t it the “social whole” which enforces those rights trough its institutions? Without 
the “social whole” Benson’s abstract rights have no practical importance.88 Having a “social 
whole” requires, of course, a political theory of the state, even if only a minimal state, a-la 
Nozick. But this just begs the question why the “social whole” should expend public resources to 
preserve abstract rights when doing so causes it to fail the global fairness test? We think it can do 
a better (egalitarian) job more globally by negating brute luck, including luck in being sorted to 
CJ or DJ justice machines.
Moreover, Benson justifies his “atomistic” view of agents by claiming that “the minimal 
condition of agents being genuinely responsible subjects is that they have the moral power to 
choose from a standpoint that is not tied to anything particular.”89 But why choose the “minimal 
condition” in the first place? Unlike in economics, where parsimonious modeling of economic 
behavior with the fewest possible assumptions has more than merely esthetic advantages, such as 
simplifying the mathematical tractability of the model, here it is hard to see the benefit of doing 
so. In fact, the person that Rawls and other DJ theorists have in mind looks “thin” enough to 
us—it only requires a very general shared notion of the good. Is all that we are left with is some 
esthetic admiration for a reduced form? That does not seem to justify the harsh implications in 
terms of global fairness. Benson and Weinrib may indeed offer an internally compelling 
construction of CJ from a thin version of personality, but there may be other ways of deriving the 
duties and protections we care about, ways more immediately tied to the social concerns we must 
ultimately face when we instituted the demands of justice in a concrete social world. 
Thus, we arrive at similar point to the one we arrived with Weinrib. Benson’s project is to 
tell us what a distinct (from DJ) concept of CJ might look like. But that does not mean such a 
87 Id., at 576. 
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concept ought to exist in order to deal fairly with people’s misfortunes. Indeed, Benson himself 
eventually admits that even the complete absence of a CJ sphere is not a problem for his CJ 
theory, and that therefore it might be possible to leave no space for the operation of CJ at all.90
We think so too. 
Global vs. Local View of Interactions 
Another way in which corrective justice theorists talk about a necessary 
distinction from distributive justice is that the former elaborates principles which govern local 
interactions, whereas the latter elaborates principles which govern global interactions. One of the 
most well known theorist that sees the distinction of CJ from DJ as inherent in the different types 
of interaction their principles regulate is Ernest Weinrib. Again, Weinrib does not explicitly 
argue for creating or maintaining a distinction between CJ and DJ as theories or institutions.
Rather, he claims that, on the basis of the formalist principles upon which corrective justice is 
elaborated, a categorical distinction in the “structures of justification” between CJ and DJ is 
apparent.91 Meaning that, in so far as the normative practice of tort law is structured the way it is, 
it is categorically distinct from DJ. CJ defines fairness in transactions, whereas distributive 
justice defines fairness in allocation of social burdens and benefits. For Weinrib, these two 
distinct principles successfully rationalize our intuitions in an exhaustive fashion in these realms. 
Our claim in this paper is that CJ and DJ do not fully capture all of our intuitions about fairness,
(alternatively, fails to fully rationalize all our intuitions); somewhere between the cracks of CJ 
and DJ and RJ there is an operation of luck we find contrary to an egalitarian notion of fairness 
requiring treating people as equals. We now explain this in more detail. 
Weinrib’s distinction between CJ and DJ is based on the same kind of formalism that 
informs the content of his theory of CJ. He claims the distinction arises from a conceptual, not 
empirical, classification.92 In his account, DJ differs from CJ in structure not subject matter: 
“both forms of justice have as their subject matter the things and events that figure in external 
relations among persons; they differ in the structure of the operation that each performs upon 
90 Benson, supra note 88, at 619. 
91
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those things and events.”93 Weinrib describes the differences between the structures of operation 
between CJ and DJ: CJ is immediate and directly links parties through the notion of correlative 
wrong and harm, DJ links parties in a mediated and indirect fashion. This distinction is 
formalized in Aristotle’s description of different mathematical operations for each form of 
justice. He makes the distinction between CJ and DJ on two levels: the kind of equality each is 
designed to protect, and the respective ‘structure of operations’ performed to protect their 
distinctive kinds of equality. DJ protects geometric or proportional equality which is achieved 
when social resources are divided among citizens relative to some criterion or merit. CJ protects 
a transactional equality or ‘quantitative’ equality between parties to a transaction, which is the 
norm of behavior in the interaction in question.94
As Risptein observed, Aristole’s account of DJ is a patterned theory of DJ and not a 
historical one.95 Aristotle’s concept of DJ is static; it is about whether people’s holdings are in 
proportion to virtue. It is not a dynamic concept concerned with how the current pattern of 
holdings came about. But, as we argued above, no modern political theory advances a static, 
patterned theory of DJ. All DJ theorists give, in one way or another, some weight to dynamic, 
historical, factors.96 And again, as we argued above, the historical factors that DJ theorists 
consider have to do with notions of responsibility that strike a balance between security and 
liberty. Thus, modern theories do not fit well into the Aristotelian DJ paradigm.97 From this one 
could conclude that: first, Aristotle’s distinction, even if were relevant back then, is irrelevant 
today. The only thing that remained is the nomenclature “distributive justice” but it means today 
something else. Second, that in fact CJ and DJ are closely linked in that they are both based on 
the same concept of balancing liberty and security.98
But, as mentioned above Weinrib does not base the dichotomy between CJ and DJ on the 
subject matter they operate. Rather, Weinrib defends the Aristotelian’s distinction on purely 
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structural grounds. Indeed, in Wienrib’s view corrective justice is categorically distinct from 
distributive justice because the former is structured by correlativity, which means it necessarily 
operates exclusively on the local level of interactions. Corrective justice’s formal property of 
correlativity comes from the basic relationship of plaintiff to defendant, which in turn demands 
that the assessments of liability in corrective justice be limited to those considerations which are 
common to both plaintiff and defendant. In this sense correlativity narrows the focus to 
necessarily local considerations and, by definition, restricts consideration of global issues. 
Weinrib maintains: “no distributive considerations can serve as a justification for holding one 
person liable to another” and that “for purposes of justifying a determination of liability, 
corrective justice is independent of DJ.”99 Similarly, he claims “there is a conceptual difference 
between the correlative logic of CJ and the comparative logic of DJ.”100
Along these same lines, Perry makes a claim about the unique nature of CJ when he 
characterizes it as addressing a “local problem”, whereas DJ addresses a “global problem”. He 
describes the issue as “CJ rectifies loss on a local scale, between two persons…the local 
mechanisms cannot respond satisfactorily to the global problem [of maintaining a distributive 
scheme].”101
In response to these arguments, we will make two claims very similar in nature to our 
claims above. First, that upon closer inspection corrective justice does not exclusively admit of 
only local considerations and correlative logic. Second, we will claim that while local versus
global is an interesting distinction, it has no independent normative force that demands a divide 
between CJ and DJ, especially if such a divide comes at a price to treating people as equals. 
Although the operations of corrective justice assessing liability and awarding 
compensation are structured according to a correlative, local logic, CJ also admits of 
comparative logic in a fundamental way. That is, in determining both which interests are 
protected and which actions are faulty, CJ must engage in the type of global accounting and 
distributing characteristic of DJ. In order to specify which security interests are protected, and 
thereby subject to compensation if transgressed, CJ must indeed take account of a global issues 
such as how specific interests in things (such as bodily integrity and property) allow us to lead a 
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meaningful life.102 Thus, with respect to designating a specific standard of care, we need to take 
account of global issues to determine behavioral standards which reflect what levels of care and 
precautions are reasonable to expect of citizens as they go about their diverse life projects. 
Coleman and Ripstein make essentially this point in their paper Mischief and Misfortune. 
In this paper they claim that both CJ and DJ are responses to the question of “who owns which of 
life’s misfortunes?” and that their respective institutional embodiments both seek to “allocate 
misfortune and its burdens fairly.”103 Yet accounting for a fair distribution of misfortune requires 
an analytically prior account of the costs of activities and a general theory of what we owe each 
other, both of which are “normative all the way down”.104 Therefore, the fault system involves 
global logic because, in drawing moral boundaries between persons it invokes local concepts 
such as “control, agency, and choice” which only make sense “in concert with substantive 
judgments about why various activities matter to us and about the ways in which they do.”105
The fault system embodies egalitarian commitments to both fairness and equality. It is fair 
because it divides the risks of activities between potential plaintiffs and defendants in a way that 
is acceptable to both parties and it reflects equality because everyone is given a like level of 
security and liberty interests. However, formulating specific standards of care and selecting 
which interests are to be protected requires taking account of the “particular liberty interests and 
security interests that are at stake” and making substantive, normative arguments about the 
importance of those interests.106
In conclusion, although the ideal of a unique principle of justice for local, as opposed to 
global, interactions is an interesting distinction, it is apparent that CJ is not exclusively a local 
principle of justice at all. Indeed, with respect to some of the most important aspects of CJ, the 
determination of protected interests and fault, global considerations play a paramount role. 
Our second point, moreover, is that nothing in a descriptive distinction between local and 
global interactions has normative force to generate categorically distinctive principles of justice 
to govern their respective realms. Indeed, the burden would be on tort theorists who make this 
102
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argument to explain why, if we had to design the fairest regime, would we design a regime 
which treats differently global versus local interactions?  On the contrary, it would seem from the 
above discussion, global logic and assessments are central to CJ’s commitment to equality. The 
interests that are protected by CJ are those which allow individual citizens to stand in relations of 
equality in public and private relations. To use Sen’s formulation of DJ, we need to protect 
against wrongful loss of the capabilities necessary for citizens to participate as full, equal beings.
Correspondingly, equality requires that we enforce responsibility for causing wrongful transfer 
so that one citizen cannot impose the costs of their activities unfairly upon others. 
Agent-general vs. Agent-relative
Another familiar distinction that is pointed to as a reason for maintaining a theoretical 
and institutional divide between corrective and distributive justice has to do with the types of 
reasons each principle supplies. In his well- known abandonment of the annulment thesis, Jules 
Coleman cites this distinction as a primary motivation for re-formulating his theory of corrective 
justice, least it “reduces to a form of distributive justice.”107 Coleman, among others,108 claims 
that corrective and distributive justice are distinguished from one another on the basis of the 
former’s agent-relative normative claims as opposed to the latter’s agent-general normative 
claims. We will make two arguments—again similar in nature to the ones we made above—with 
respect to this distinction. First, we will question if CJ produces exclusively agent-relative types 
of normative claims. Second, even if descriptively CJ principles generate exclusively agent-
relative reasons for acting, this fact alone does not provide a convincing reason to enforce a 
division of labor between CJ and DJ, if doing so comes at a cost to fairness. After going through 
all this trouble, we will actually argue that the agent-relative aspect of CJ is a compelling feature 
which should be retained, albeit in a revised form, in any reconfigured approach to accident law 
because it both instills and reflects egalitarian values of responsibility and equality. 
We now explain it in more detail. Most theorists of both CJ and DJ say that distributive 
justice generates agent-general reasons for action because it specifies moral or political 
principles defining obligations we have by virtue of membership in a community, as opposed to 
by virtue of a special relationship to another individual. The claims of DJ are agent-general 
because they apply to all members of the community equally. Corrective justice generates agent-
107
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specific reasons for action because it specifies a duty to compensate when our actions are faulty 
in some appropriate way and cause harm to another person. The claims of corrective justice are 
agent-relative because the content of the claims are “restricted to parties who bear some 
important normative relationship to one another.”109 The theoretical notions we explored earlier 
of outcome-responsibility, responsible agency, correlativity, and reciprocity underlie the agent-
specific aspect of tort law.
However, it is inaccurate to characterized corrective justice and tort law as purely 
motivated by ‘agent-specific’ reasons. Although it enforces agent-specific obligations, the 
institution of tort law is motivated by elements of agent-general reasons as well. This is evident 
from the fact that tort law is not funded by “user fees”110, most modern liberal democracies 
devote significant public resources to providing a venue to allow individuals to pursue tort 
claims. If the claims of CJ were just the concern of the doer whom it binds and the victim whom 
it benefits, why not make the administrative cost of enforcement of the CJ claims an element of 
the liable party’s damages? We conjecture that what drives the public provision of CJ institutions 
is that we all share some agent-general interest in the values of equality and responsibility 
represented and enforced by CJ claims.
There is an element of tort law that, like criminal law, is motivated by a general social 
concern for the conduct of our fellow citizens, and how such conduct affects the world we want 
to live in. Our agent-general concern for tort law could be characterized in several ways. First, 
tort law is “expressive” of both currently shared norms of behavior and a social ideal.111 We 
want to live in a world where others take due care because they value the inherent worth of other 
humans. The ideal of a society of equals is expressed when people respect others as beings 
whose projects and goals deserve being taken into account, if not respected, as we pursue our 
own projects. Viewed as a whole, the duties of care in tort doctrines embody the political ideal of 
a civil society of equals. This would imply we have a similar concern for the behavior of both D 
and E, despite the fact that E did not occasion harm to another. We are still concerned with the 
“social harm” E imposes, and the fact that he does not show respect for others in his actions. 
109
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Tort law not only reflects the values of equality and responsibility, it also functions to 
instill them. There is a sense in which we all share an interest in bringing about the state of 
affairs where people compensate those harms caused by their faulty action, which is an agent-
general motivation. This desire is motivated not just by the principle of CJ—that people ought to 
bear these costs because of a fundamental principle  of outcome responsibility, or because the 
fault principle  points to the defendant as the appropriate bearer of these costs. It is also 
motivated by the notion that in such a world our fellow citizens are instilled with the social 
values of responsibility and prudence.112 Instilling values does not have to be reduced to 
deterrence in the law and economics model of calculating the appropriate level of care based on 
the costs of conduct. Rather, we mean instilling in the sense of reflecting in our practices a 
fundamental moral sense of respecting others as ends in themselves, as taking their security and 
liberty interest seriously as reasons for conforming our conduct to an appropriate level of care. 
This is the kernel we want to keep from tort law. The harm-based operation of tort law 
personalizes the potential consequences of our actions in a way that general maxims to ‘take 
care’ do not. 
To summarize this Section, we hope we showed that the various arguments put forward 
in the literature for maintaining the distinction between CJ and DJ (allocation of resources vs. 
private wrongs, thick vs. thin view of personality, global vs. local interactions, agent general vs 
agent specific reason giving properties) cannot justify the distinction ex-ante, but at best can 
describe it ex-post. Second, and more importantly, we believe that these distinctions, even if they 
offered determinate analytical boundaries between CJ and DJ, should not be internally evaluated 
but rather be normatively evaluated and justified in the same way any human construct is 
evaluated—with reference to values we share. We believe that an internal justification, one that 
justifies a distinction only because it makes CJ (and DJ or RJ) more coherent, is not enough to 
justify the existence of a distinct CJ machine in the first place, if doing so compromises 
respecting the constitutive commitments of justice: fairness and equal enforcement of 
responsibility. Indeed, and unfortunately, viewing these distinctions as relevant does not do 
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much more than maintain the separation between CJ and DJ or RJ as internally coherent 
machines of justice, yet at the expense of hurting the global production of justice. We believe 
this should be enough to justify revisiting traditional theories of fairness in dealing with 
misfortunes, namely CJ, as well as the social institutions created to manifest this theory, namely 
tort law. 
VIII. Practical Reasons: The Isolation of CJ Creates Unfair Outcomes
Thus far we have focused on sources of luck—the agent of misfortune for victims, and
the causation of harm for doers —which create unfair disparities in liability and damages at odds 
with the normative commitments of corrective justice that arise s from its theoretical formulation. 
In addition to these sources of luck built into the theory of CJ, there are also multiple practical 
operations which systematically generate unfair discrepancies in liability and compensation for 
otherwise similar actors. Specifically, factors such as familiarity with legal rights and recourses 
of the tort litigation system, acquaintance with attorneys, ability to obtain medical care to 
document injuries necessary to prove harm, economics of case litigation, and other related social 
and economic factors will all affect the compensation similarly situated accident victims receive. 
The relevant point we hope to touch on in this brief section is that these factors, like the luck of 
the draw of causation, are morally irrelevant and, whenever possible should be addressed to 
assure like cases are treated alike. 
Before we propose a sketch of an alternative scheme, we would like to point out that tort 
law provides only 10% of the $500 billion annual recoveries for accidences in the United States. 
Tort law therefore constitutes a relative small portion of the institutions compensating the 
victims of misfortune.113 Further, there is no efficient coordination of benefits between various 
federal programs, private insurance markets, and tort law. This problem, besides exacerbating the 
inefficiencies in the overall recoveries system, increases the lack of horizontal and vertical equity 
between similarly and differently (respectively) situated unfortunates.114
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A particularly worrisome issue in the current tort system is that most tort victims are left 
outside of the CJ justice club, to change the metaphor just a bit. This of course creates a problem 
of under-deterrence, which we will ignore for now. Instead, we will focus on why this is a
concern from an egalitarian perspective—that injured people are denied entrance to the CJ 
justice club, but are left with some limited access to the DJ club. There are various reasons why 
people are denied access to the CJ club. For example, a victim lacking information on the causal 
chain of the injury, difficulties proving the case in court even if the facts are known (say because 
of inadequate access to medical care, or if treatment of injuries were not sufficiently 
documented), etc. are all such reasons. These reasons make a lot of sense from an internal CJ 
perspective; indeed, why would someone who cannot prove her case in court (even if not her 
fault, but neither the defendant’s) get access to the CJ club? Yet these reasons make little sense 
from a broader egalitarian perspective.115
Another related point is to observe who the people are who are denied access to the CJ 
club. Once we observe that the high costs of the current tort system (which we believe are an 
unavoidable consequence of the requirement of CJ to prove causation, prove harm, etc) prevent 
people with low expected recovery from receiving any CJ benefits at all, the answer is clear. It is 
those who we would worry will not get good seats in the DJ club either. Because compensation 
in the current tort law is based, among other things, on loss of income for the remaining working 
years, the low-income, the old, women, children and minorities—who on average have lower 
average income—are less likely to have an expected recovery that will be large enough for a 
lawyer to take their cases in the first place. Those who lack social networks inclusive of 
attorneys, are unfamiliar with the operations of insurance and tort law will also tend to be less 
likely to get full compensation for their injuries, because they might not pursue legitimate claims 
either from lack of information on how to do so, or lack of financial or time resources to do so.
Moreover, low-income and high-income victims pay the same price for products, services, 
automobile insurance, etc.; prices of all these products and services reflect the expected loss of 
income in the entire pool of consumers, patients, insureds, etc. This means that, in effect, low-
income people cross-subsidize the high income people in the current tort system.116 These, in our 
115
 For a fully developed critique of how the practical operation of tort law fails to embody the commitments of CJ, 
see Stepen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 558 (1985). 
116
 To clarify this point, consider the following example. A is a high income victim and B is a low income victim, 
and both suffer the same injury, say, from a product that was defected. A will get much higher economic damages. 
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view, are important pragmatic points against CJ in an institutional form segregated from that of 
DJ or RJ. 
In practice, race, gender, and age are highly correlated with access to the CJ club. Thus, 
even if the CJ normative defense of the current tort system was compelling, the fact that the only 
way it is manifested in practice leaves so many people out of the CJ club raises questions about 
the legitimacy of the CJ club. The fact that those people who are left out of the CJ club are 
exactly that should concern us most in the DJ context just reinforces the critique. A legal system 
which implements notions of corrective justice such that it disproportionaly  benefits those with 
high income in terms of both access to and benefits of the justice system, goes against basic 
egalitarian impulses. 
Lastly, we conjecture that perhaps the fact that there is a justice club for the elite (CJ),
and a separate justice club (DJ), for all the others who cannot get into the CJ club, where the
bundle of benefits they can get at the DJ club is nevertheless determined by the same elite,117
may explain why this acoustic separation was stable for so many years despite its evident 
unfairness. 
IV. Conclusion. 
In this paper we have tried to develop the simple intuition that fairness requires, as much 
as possible, that like cases be treated alike. We have argued that the luck which determines 
dissimilar liability and compensation in our examples A-F is at odds with the egalitarian notion 
of fairness as equality and responsibility. We claimed that the dissimilar liability and 
compensation was largely due to a strict distinction between forms and institutions of justice, a 
distinction which fails the fairness test because it fails to confine the operation of luck to a 
normatively acceptable role. After surveying the arguments put forward by CJ theorists 
defending a categorical distinction of CJ from retributive and distributive principles, we argued 
that, although analytical distinctions can be made between different forms of justice, (although,
we also suggest that the distinction were not as sharp some commentators suggest) there is no 
But both paid the same price for the defected product (which reflected the average legal liability associated with the 
product). As a result B paid more than its actuarially fair price for the product and A paid less. B cross subsidized A. 
117
 By this we mean that the benefits offered by social programs and other income transfer programs are the outcome 
of a political system primarily controlled by the economic elite. 
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good reason to defend an acoustic separation between these forms of justice when doing so 
creates unfair outcomes. 
We are not the first to observe that our distinct institutions of CJ, DJ and RJ deal in 
human misfortunes not so definitely distinct from one another.118 Yet, in this paper we have 
suggested something more. First, we have argued that, as a normative matter, egalitarians should 
not hold a commitment to theoretical distinctions between retributive, distributive and corrective 
justice as lexically prior to a global commitment to fairness. The specific unfairness we are 
concerned about in this paper is that some victims of misfortune are afforded massively 
dissimilar compensation because of irrelevant differences—the luck of the source of 
misfortune—and some careless actors who violate duties of care escape any assessment of 
liability whatsoever because of irrelevant differences—the luck of the absence of victims. The 
source of this unfairness is the role luck is allowed to play in sorting  different cases into different 
institutions of justice. 
Second, we have claimed that this unfairness does not arise simply because the various 
theories of corrective, distributive and retributive justice are imperfectly implemented in their 
respective institutions. Rather, we believe that many corrective justice theorists have expended 
unnecessary theoretical energy trying to conceptualize the demands of CJ as impervious to the 
principles of either retributive or distributive justice. Our intuitions about fairness in 
compensation for misfortunes and liability for careless actions are best captured when we 
integrate insights of both retributive and distributive justice in theorizing what justice demands in 
liability for risks and compensation for harms. This is not to say that CJ can or should be reduced 
to principles of either DJ or RJ. Corrective justice expresses a unique and irreducible principle of 
justice that captures the intuition that we are concerned with: equality in transactions and 
personal responsibility for actions. We are merely claiming these values are under-enforced 
when we limit our concern over careless action to only those cases when the actor unluckily 
118 For example,Weinrib has argued that “the legal regime of personal injuries can be organized either correctively 
or distributively. Correctively, my striking you is a tort committed by me against you, and my payment to you of 
damages will restore the equality disturbed by my wrong. Distributively, the same incident activates a compensation 
scheme that shifts resources among members of a pool of contributors and recipients in accordance with a 
distributive criterion. From the standpoint of Aristotle's analysis, nothing about a personal injury as such consigns it 
to the domain of a particular form of justice. The differentiation between the corrective and distributive justice lies 
not in the different subject matters to which they apply, but in the differently structured operation that each performs 
on a subject matter available to both.” Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 403 415 (1992). See 
also,  Coleman & Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortunes, supra note 103. 
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caused harm, and when we allow the luck over the source of misfortune to determine massively 
dissimilar compensation to otherwise identical injuries.
Another way of expressing our argument is that, by relaxing the strict bilateral, 
correlative structure of tort law, we can both maintain the core commitment of CJ—that of doing 
justice between wrongdoers and their victims—while expanding the scope of fair treatment to 
both unsuccessful careless doers and similarly situated blameless victims.119
Our fairness test is driven by the same impulse of fairness that drove of the minority 
opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R, the majority in Summers v Tice, the majority in Sindell v. 
Abott Laboratories: Hymowitz v. Eli lilly & Co.120 In Paslgraf v. Long Island R.R. the negligent 
act of the Long Island R.R. employee in dislodging the package of fireworks caused Mrs 
Palsgraf’s injury, but since the package was innocent looking, the effect of negligently handling 
it on Mrs Palsgraf could not have been reasonably anticipated. Judge Andrews argued that 
“where there is the unreasonable act…there is negligence whether damage does or does not 
result. That is immaterial”.121 He then provides an example: “should we drive down Broadway at 
a reckless speed, we are negligent whether we strike an approaching car or miss it by an inch. 
The act itself is wrongful. It is a wrong not only to those who happen to be within the radius of 
danger, but to all who might have been there--a wrong to the public at large.”122Judge Andrews 
words reflect two points we mentioned earlier. First, that the occurrence of harm should not be a 
necessary condition for assessing liability. And, second, that careless action involves a kind of 
social harm, what he calls the wrong to the public at large. 
In Summers v. Tice the plaintiff, Summers, was severely injured by a single bullet while 
hunting with the defendants, Tice and Simonson, who both negligently shot in his direction. He 
could not prove which of the two negligent hunters had actually injured him, and which had
missed him. The Supreme Court of California took the innovative step of shifting the burden of 
proof to the defendants, Tice and Simonson, to disprove their causal contribution to Summers’ 
injury. Because as an empirical matter it was impossible to sort out whose bullet actually hit the 
119
 We thank Gregory Keating for this formulation of our argument.
120
 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); Summer V Tice, 33 Cal 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 
(1948). Sindell v. Abott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal, 1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 
(N.Y 1989). 
121
 Palsgraf at 349. 
122
 Id. Weinrib is right that Andrews’ analysis does not make sense from an internal CJ perspective. But since we are 
not interested in necessarily maintaining that perspective, we believe our analysis is immune from that critique. 
Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 Chi-Kent L. Rev 407 440 (1987). 
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defendant, the Court in effect found them joint ly and severally liable because both were 
negligent. Again we see the drive to relax the strict demands of causation for a fairer result, 
globally understood. 
Sindell was a product liability case involving the drug DES in which the daughters of 
mothers who took DES during pregnancy and subsequently developed cancerous vaginal and 
cervical growths sued various manufacturers of the generic drug. The daughters could not show 
which manufacturer was the actual supplier of the pills used by their mothers, and therefore the 
causal link between plaintiff and defendant was unspecified. The California Supreme Court held 
that when a substantial share of DES manufacturers are brought together as defendants market 
share liability is appropriate, and the burden of proof is shifted to each defendant to demonstrate 
that in fact they did not sell to the plaintiff's mother's drugstore. Judith Thompson posed the 
prescient question of why the court placed the condition that Sindell must join in her action a 
substantial share of the manufacturers that were risk creators ? After all, if their liability is capped 
in their market share, why would it matter? We think that the answer might be that the court was 
concerned about the unfairness in distribution of liability between similarly situated negligent 
actors when only some are required to pay their share, while many others are not. As Thompson 
explains: “if the plaintiff sues only those who manufactured…40% of the drug, and they lose, 
then admittedly they pay only 40% of the plaintiff’s costs; but the other who manufactured the 
remaining 60% of the drug have no liability imposed on them at all.”123 Lastly, in Hymowitz, 
another DES case, the NY court ruled that each manufacturer is negligent, and that each should 
therefore pay according to market share it possessed at the time the mothers ingested the drug
irrespective of any causal inquiry. In this way Hymowitz goes beyond Sindell, because the court 
held that all manufacturers should pay, even those who could show they did not cause a 
particular plaintiff’s injury. Hymowitz demonstrates again, yet in even stronger way, the intuitive 
drive to hold all similarly situated wrongdoers liable for wrongful conduct at the expense of 
relaxing the CJ requirement of a causal link between doer's wrongful conduct and sufferer's 
harm. 
123
 Judith Jarvis Thompson, Remarks on Causation and Liability, Philosophy and public Affairs, Vol 13(2) (1984) 
101123. Thompson thinks that a better reason for that requirement is that the relevant market-share each defendant 
is held liable for is with respect to the total share held by the actual defendants in the lawsuit. Accordingly, if the 
plaintiff does not bring together substantial share of the risk, defendants might pay way more of their original market 
share. Thompson’s interpretation of the relevant market share was later declared as incorrect, as explained by the 
California Supreme Court in Brown V. Superior Court of San Francisco, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal, 1988)  
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In sum, all these examples represent the same intuition that once someone is negligent 
she should bear liability, even if it the damage is too remote (as in Palsgraf), if it is not clear that 
the negligence act caused the damage at all (as in Summers), if it is clear that it did not ( as in 
Hymowitz), or if the defendant cannot disprove her causation of harm (as in Sindell). While these 
intuitions about fairness in liability might not be legitimately accommodated by a CJ conception 
of tort law because they violate the correlative principle, they do have place in a more globally 
fair scheme which deals with misfortunes. Moreover, as we explained at length above, not only 
do we share the same fairness concerns expressed in these cases, we take it one step further and 
apply the same intuition to the victim’s side.
Before we briefly explore possibly institutional alternatives to tort law hat fall within the 
zone of fairness we have tried to establish through our arguments in this paper, it is important to 
clarify what we have not argued. First, we do not offer an original, substantive defense of the 
notion that luck should not determine people’s desert and responsibility. We try to show that 
indeed it is prevalent in DJ, RJ and CJ and we treat it as a shared normative starting point from 
which to build our critique. Those that do not share a commitment to negating (some) luck as 
way to increase fairness may not be moved by the arguments offered here.124 Second, we are not 
claiming that these various principles of justice—corrective, distributive and retributive—can be 
reduced to a “comprehensive doctrine” of fairness that can be applied in a standardized fashion 
to the structuring of the respective institutional forms of accident law, tax and transfer systems, 
and criminal law. 125  Rather we argue that the notions of fair treatment developed in each cannot 
always be confined to that realm, and has implications for the evaluation of our practices in the 
other realms. Third, we do not say that a commitment to CJ as categorically distinct from DJ or 
RJ costs too much in terms of society’s resources; our argument here is not that the tort system is 
too expensive and therefore should be abolished, although that may well be the case. The only 
currency we are using here is the currency of fairness. Thus, we believe we avoid issues of 
commensurability, because all the tradeoffs we are talking about at this stage are in terms of 
notions of fairness. 
124
 That is not to say that the precise content of a commitment to “fairness” is obvious nor non-controversial; we 
leave the defense of the commitment to fairness to another occasion. 
125
 John Rawls makes a similar point regarding his conception of political justice as being limited to the subject of 
the major political, economic and social institutions of society: “justice as fairness is a political conception of 
justice: that is, it is designed for the special case of the basic structure and is not intended as a comprehensive moral 
doctrine.” Rawls, supra note 7,at 12
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Fourth, our argument is not limited to a critique of the imperfect way in which principles of 
corrective, distributive or retributive justice are incarnated in institutions of tort law, taxation or 
criminal law. Were both theories of egalitarian distributive, corrective, and retributive justice 
instituted perfectly, there would still be a disturbing discrepancy in the treatment of equally 
blameless victims and equally careless actors. This is so because theories of CJ (and DJ and RJ) 
remain committed to an acoustic separation between their respective principles, a separation 
which impairs us from hearing the costs to fairness that arises from a sorting rule in which luck 
plays a major role.126
We take no view whether CJ is pre-social and therefore analytically prior to DJ, or vice 
versa, we think that the fair negation of luck should be prior to both.127 Put differently, we do not 
accept a limited role for fairness because of a lexically prior commitment to CJ, or DJ or RJ, but 
rather accept a limited role for CJ, RJ and DJ as developed by various theorists because we 
believe it serves well our lexically prior commitment to fairness.
Lastly, and most importantly, we do not argue that all losses which may be attributable to 
luck should be totally negated from our lives. Just as every type of misfortune (in love or cards 
for example) is not society’s concern, every type of loss due to brute luck—the vicissitudes of 
nature or fortune—is not of collective, normative concern. It is not possible in practice, nor 
necessarily desirable in theory, to design institutions negating all losses due to luck.128 However, 
we think there is a relevant core of types of losses to which society has a duty to at least 
considering responding. We hold this includes at least losses to bodily integrity, and perhaps 
much more. Rawls called those core things that a reasonable person needs to live a meaningful 
life ‘primary goods’. 
126
 Of course, if a perfect DJ theory is implemented, such that luck is not a factor in determining peoples’ life 
outcomes, then indeed we would not have worry about the CJ/DJ distinction. However, such a perfect DJ theory 
does not exist, all existing egalitarian theories call for a DJ/CJ distinction. Such a perfect theory of DJ does what we 
propose to do here with one difference: it calls it a theory of DJ, where we are indifferent to how one calls it. But the 
fact of the matter is that no one has offered such a theory of DJ. Major theorists of DJ (and CJ) have always 
defended a distinction between rules that apply to the “basic structure” of society, to use Rawls’s term, and rules that 
apply to private interaction. We elaborate on this point below. 
127 See, Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundations of Corrective Justice, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 138 (1999)
128
 In fact, given the objective scarcity of resources, sometime a role for luck is even required by fairness. As Arthur 
Ripstein points out “whether chance is arbitrary depends on how it comes to play the role that it does.” To use his 
example, it is more fair to have random police patrols than to use racial stereotyping to police the streets. Random 
police patrols which apprehend only some ‘unsuccessful’ attempting criminals is not unfair even when such patrols 
miss other attempting criminals. Arthur Ripstein, supra note 4 at 12 (emphasis added).
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We are not arguing that all instances of any type of careless action not resulting in harm 
should be subject to fines, this will require unmanageable inquiries and violations of liberty and 
privacy. Rather we are concerned only with those types of actions which, if harm had manifest, 
would result in a finding of liability. There are epistemological and normative reasons for 
limiting our concern to that set of careless actions. First, in terms of the normative limits of our 
concern, tort law already grapples with these questions of what, as a social and political 
community, we think is reasonable standard to expect people to conform their behavior to as a 
manifestation or equal respect for others security interests. The doctrines of duty of care in 
negligence law reflect a social determination on the normative question of what is reasonable as 
opposed to unreasonable risk imposition. As a general matter we find that resolution fairly 
satisfactory. However, the point of this paper is not to make a substantive defense of specific 
duties of care in tort law, but merely to say once we have established what exactly the standards 
of care are demanded of equal responsible citizens, there is no reason to limit our concern to only 
those cases where failure to live up to those standards causes harm. Second, as an 
epistemological matter, we agree that technical limitations on our ability to detect unsuccessful 
careless acts may and should limit the types of conduct we can target because the distastefulness 
of excessive surveillance should be an independent limitation on state action. But that is a 
technological-dependent matter which might well be resolved with time.    
The flip side of the concern that implication of our argument entail a massive and 
oppressive state is that the implication of our argument entails nothing more than expanding 
current RJ institutions and practices, such as policing, regulatory enforcement of standards, 
and/or fines. Our focus in this paper is less on actual institutional design and more on the 
theoretical and normative reasons for changing our practices. Terming our assessment of liability 
to unsuccessful actors “fines” is, well, fine with us. The distinction between what we propose 
here in terms of financial assessments on risk creators, and traditional RJ fines, is that whereas 
the latter is often determine by notions of deterrence or the fiscal needs of a state, the former 
should be informed by notions of fairness in rectifying a wrongful act calculated in terms of 
social harm done and expected harm from the type of risk imposed. 
Having said all that, we would like to note that we believe there might be various 
institutional approaches which would address the unfair role of luck we identified in liability and 
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compensation. As discussed in the sections on DJ, CJ, RJ and luck, egalitarians dispute 
substantive notions of fairness. The question of what is properly considered brute luck as 
opposed to option luck is ultimately a normative question that must be hashed out in the political 
arena. Our argument in this paper was merely that any such system must take account not only of 
corrective justice principles, but also of distributive and retributive principles to assure global 
fairness.
Our substantive arguments about the moral similarities between equally blameless 
victims and equally careless actors do not dictate any specific policy approach. With respect to 
the cases of equally blameless victims, we believe any accident compensation scheme must 
assure comparable bodily harms are compensated similarly, regardless of the cause of the harm. 
This argument is based not on the claim that there is something essential and true about the 
physical similarity between injured individuals, but on a normative egalitarian commitment to 
assuring equal bodily integrity.
 With respect to the cases of equally careless doers, we believe there would be various 
approaches which would fall with the “zone of fairness”129 defined by respect for responsibility 
and equality. We have argued that relying on causality and harm, as does the current regime of 
tort law, under-enforces the values of responsibility and equality that CJ expresses.  We believe 
that the values of equality and responsibility, which expressed in the correlative structure of CJ 
ground the duty to compensate for wrongful losses, extends beyond that structure and actually 
has implications for fairness in compensation and liability for both blameless victims of nature 
and the unsuccessful wrongdoers. Whereas CJ theorists argue that harm is a necessary condition 
for liability (and harm plus fault are sufficient conditions), we distinguish between necessary and 
sufficient conditions for imposing liability on doers, and for compensating the victims. Thus, we 
argue that violation of a duty of care alone is a necessary and sufficient condition to impose 
some measure of liability on careless doers whereas the existence of harm, in our view, should 
not be a necessary condition at all in assessing liability. But that of course does not mean that the 
existence of harm is not important. Harm is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
compensating the victims, no matter what the source of the harm is, if it falls within what we 
called the ‘core’. The level of harm is also good measure of the liability to be imposed on the 
129
 See discussion in Section VI. 
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wrongdoer, although, as we argue below, certain types of “eggshell luck” might need to be 
eliminated there too. 
Causation of harm may also be a relevant consideration for treatment of wrongdoers, yet 
as we argued in section X, violation of duties of care has normative significance independent of 
causation.130 We are simply arguing that as a matter of fairness we must be concerned both with 
careless actions that cause harm and those that luckily escape causing harm. But this does not 
dictate exactly what we should do with cases of unsuccessful careless drivers with respect to 
assessing liability because, as we have argued above, assessing the appropriate level of liability 
is a normative exercise in determining what is appropriate to expect of people, not discovering 
some fact about the world like causation or some metaphysical truth like moral blameworthiness. 
Therefore, we believe there is a “zone of fairness” in which various policy configurations fit the 
demands of respect for equality and responsibility of egalitarian commitments. 
Therefore, as we have argued there are no good theoretical or normative reasons not to 
address the unfairness inherent in the current tort law approach to accidents. In this conclusion 
we would also like to suggest that there are no practical considerations to impede constructing a
more fair institution of accident law which minimizes the objectionable operation of luck we 
identified in this paper. We do not intend our critiques to be utopian or purely theoretical. Instead 
we hope to offer some practical guidance towards a feasible alternative institutional design that 
can implement our notion of fairness.131 Of course a full account of such an institutional design 
is way beyond the scope of this paper, but below we present a brief sketch of a possible 
130
 Peter Brinks makes a somewhat similar point when he argues that theorizing about tort law should refocus on its 
character as a civil wrong, as opposed to the remedial practices that have grown up around it such as compensation. 
A civil wrong “is the breach of a legal duty which affects the interest of an individual to a degree which the law 
regards as sufficient to allow that individual to complain on his or her own account rather than as the representative 
of society as a whole.” Professor Brinks argues that “the content of the remedial or secondary obligation triggered 
by a wrong is for the law to decide as a matter of policy constrained only by extrinsic considerations…Wrongs 
themselves dictate no fixed measure of response.” Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil Wrong, in Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law 29-51, 51 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). 
131 Richard Epstein argued that no matter what the source of misfortune is, “if there were a costless way in which the 
consequences of bad luck could be spread across everyone in society at large, without increasing the risk of its 
occurrence, then most of us would pronounce ourselves better off for the change.” (Richard Epstein, Luck  6 SOC. 
PHIL. & POLICY 17 (1988)). In a similar manner, Christopher Schroeder argued that fairness in treating luck requires 
to reconsider the institution of tort law, and that there may be only practical or pragmatic reasons for doing so. 
Schroeder is concerned that a more DJ oriented legal scheme will hurt optimal deterrence, suffer from informational 
difficulties, and be overall more expensive. Christopher Schroeder, supra note 59, at 361.   
Accident Law for Egalitarians
57
approach, which we think is different from approaches offered in the literature, and which we 
feel falls within the zone of egalitarian fairness.132
To begin with, imagine an unfortunate-compensation-fund (UCF) into which all 
wrongdoers pay, and from which all unfortunates receive money.133 For simplicity, we assume 
that it is a government managed fund; we soon relax this assumption. The UCF would be a 
mixed system between current tort law and a social insurance scheme which compensates the 
unfortunates on the basis of “lack of some equalisandum” but, simultaneously, continues to 
impose liability on the doer on the basis of “fault”, (or perhaps even on the basis of “cause” such 
as strict liability.134) By compensating on the basis of “lack of some equalisandum” we mean that 
all unfortunates will be compensated for a specified set of losses to bodily integrity. Thus no 
matter why you are disabled, whether it is because of an accident, a disease, or the way you were 
born, you will be entitled to the same type and magnitude of benefits. By imposing liability on 
the wrongdoers on the basis of “fault,” we mean that all wrongdoers will have to bear monetary 
responsibility for their careless conduct which imperils the security of others. Thus, in addition to 
regular tortfeasors, “unsuccessful” tortfeasors, also known as “risk creators,” will be held 
monetarily accountable for their misconduct, at the level of expected harm. 
Second, the UCF might compensate for the average or median loss of income in society
for such injuries. (If someone wants larger coverage, she can buy it on the free markets for first -
party insurance). Thus, the UCF will not discriminate against minorities, the elderly, women or 
132
 One would need to compare our regime to alternative regimes proposed by other theorists like Marc Franklin, 
Patrick Atiyah, Christopher Schroeder and Gregory Keating to name a few in order to convince anyone about the 
superiority of our regime. Thus, our only goal is to suggest an economically plausible alternative system, which we 
believe is also more globally egalitarian. For other examples, See Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence 
Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 808-14 ( 1967 );; Patrick Atiyah, The 
Damages Lottery, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997); ,Christopher Schroeder supra note 59. Gregory Keating,
Rawlsian Fairness And Regime Choice In The Law Of Accidents, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1857 (2004); Gregory 
Keating, Distributive And Corrective Justice In The Tort Law Of Accidents, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 193 (2000) 
133When we say “wrongdoers” we mean individuals who violate some policy defined duty of care; “unfortunates” 
refers to all those who have suffered some specified class of loss to bodily integrity or perhaps even to other things 
society finds essential for living in a Western democratic society. See our discussion above in Section VII on 
equalizing bodily integrity as a “core” commitment of any egalitarian.
134
 See Abraham & Leibman supra note 118 for this typology. Abraham and Leibman distinguished between fault 
base (tort), cause based (automobile no-fault scheme and workers’ comp) and loss based (private and social 
insurance). Our scheme is a mixed one. On the victims’ side it is a loss based. On the defendants’ side it is fault 
based.
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children. It will be age, gender and race blind in a way the current tort system is not because it 
provides them with similar compensation for similar injures.135
But is the UCF economically feasible? We believe that the administrative costs of the 
UCF might provide some savings at least per -capita.136 In addition, by auctioning off entire 
classes of legal claims, (this is where we relax the assumption that it is ran by the government) 
we believe we can increase the competition among lawyers and thus reduce that part of the 
administrative costs as well.137
What about deterrence? Unlike the old regime in New Zealand where tortfeasors were 
not held directly monetarily accountable for their misconduct, our scheme is “mixed” in that 
while the unfortunates are compensated no matter the sources of their injury, the wrongdoers are 
held accountable. The only difference would be that the UCF will go after the wrongdoers, as 
opposed to individual plaintiffs.  If at all, deterrence might be enhanced under a UCF- like system
because due to the lower administrative costs under the UCF, more people will be able to bring 
claims, so the problem of under-litigation of injury claims which currently hurts deterrence in the 
US will decrease. 
The proposal offered here is not the only possible institutional design that achieves our 
goals of fairness, and we are not committed to defending it over any other fair alternative. Our 
only goal in concluding it was to show that an alternative institutional approach  is possible. Our 
primary goal in this paper was to demonstrate that, for those with substantive egalitarian 
commitments to fairness as equality and responsibility, considering such an alternative is 
imperative.
135
 See our discussion of it supra in Section VII on how the practical operation of the tort system systematically 
excludes certain classes of individuals.
136
 The no-fault automobile regimes, worker’s compensation regimes, as well as the September 11th victim 
compensation fund and other federal programs could serve as a source of inspiration for how thousands of losses per 
year could be handled at a relatively low per-capita cost.  
137
 The idea here is that the UCF would not have to be a government fund. Instead, law firms would bid for the 
entire medical malpractice portfolio in Cook county Illinois in 2001-2003, for example. Law firms which offer to 
collect the lowest possible contingency fee will win. Such a scheme does not require lawyers to review every case 
before they bid; they just need to know about rough statistics. This will extract surplus form lawyers to the fund. It 
increases the overall pie for plaintiffs because now plaintiffs have market power. If contingency fees go down from 
25% to 20%, for example, this is another 5% of recoveries for Ps. There are some delicate incentives issues that 
need to be addressed. For example, lawyers will have to commit for a minimum amount of recovery they’ll bring to 
the fund. (They should be allowed to purchase insurance for this). Otherwise, we might see the defendants 
themselves bid for, say, 5% contingency fee and then do nothing. Commitment for a minimum recovery is a way to 
incentivize lawyers to work hard. Lawyers will bid just as mining companies bid for mining rights. There is a 
limited amount of statistics and a lot of risk, and hopefully no winner’s curse.
